

AS **History**

Democracy and Nazism: Germany, 1918–1945 7041/20 The Weimar Republic, 1918–1933 Mark scheme

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Mark schemes are prepared by the Lead Assessment Writer and considered, together with the relevant questions, by a panel of subject teachers. This mark scheme includes any amendments made at the standardisation events which all associates participate in and is the scheme which was used by them in this examination. The standardisation process ensures that the mark scheme covers the students' responses to questions and that every associate understands and applies it in the same correct way. As preparation for standardisation each associate analyses a number of students' scripts: alternative answers not already covered by the mark scheme are discussed and legislated for. If, after the standardisation process, associates encounter unusual answers which have not been raised they are required to refer these to the Lead Assessment Writer.

It must be stressed that a mark scheme is a working document, in many cases further developed and expanded on the basis of students' reactions to a particular paper. Assumptions about future mark schemes on the basis of one year's document should be avoided; whilst the guiding principles of assessment remain constant, details will change, depending on the content of a particular examination paper.

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June 2016

Democracy and Nazism: Germany, 1918–1945

AS History Component 20 The Weimar Republic, 1918–1933

Section A

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, which of these two sources is more valuable in explaining the impact of the 1923 hyperinflation crisis?

[25 marks]

Target: AO2

Analyse and evaluate appropriate source material, primary and/or contemporary to the period, within the historical context.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5: Answers will display a very good understanding of the value of the sources in relation to the issue identified in the question. They will evaluate the sources thoroughly in order to provide a well-substantiated conclusion. The response demonstrates a very good understanding of context.

 21-25
- L4: Answers will provide a range of relevant well-supported comments on the value of the sources for the issue identified in the question. There will be sufficient comment to provide a supported conclusion but not all comments will be well-substantiated, and judgements will be limited. The response demonstrates a good understanding of context.

 16-20
- L3: The answer will provide some relevant comments on the value of the sources and there will be some explicit reference to the issue identified in the question. Judgements will however, be partial and/or thinly supported. The response demonstrates an understanding of context.

 11-15
- L2: The answer will be partial. There may be either some relevant comments on the value of one source in relation to the issue identified in the question or some comment on both, but lacking depth and have little, if any, explicit link to the issue identified in the question. The response demonstrates some understanding of context.

 6-10
- L1: The answer will either describe source content or offer stock phrases about the value of the source. There may be some comment on the issue identified in the question but it is likely to be limited, unsubstantiated and unconvincing. The response demonstrates limited understanding of context.
 1-5

Nothing worthy of credit.

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Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Students must deploy knowledge of the historical context to show an understanding of the relationship between the sources and the issues raised in the question, when assessing the significance of provenance, the arguments deployed in the sources and the tone and emphasis of the sources. Descriptive answers which fail to do this should be awarded no more than Level 2 at best. Answers should address both the value and the limitations of the sources for the particular question and purpose given.

In responding to this question, students may choose to address each source in turn or to adopt a more comparative approach in order to arrive at a judgement. Either approach is equally valid and what follows is indicative of the evaluation which may be relevant.

Source A: in assessing the value of this source as an explanation, students may refer to the following:

Provenance and tone

- Source A is a statement from someone who experienced the hyperinflation; her family, which was one of fish merchants, would have been hard hit by inflation and so she is in a good position to describe its devastating effects
- she is describing her experiences in 1947. This may affect her account, e.g. hindsight could have affected her recollections of this time
- her tone is one of anger and resentment against the classes who did well out of the inflation.

Content and argument

- Erna von Pustau argues that there were 'winners' during this inflation. As she says many big businessmen, such as Hugo Stinnes, prospered during this time. In addition, as she points out, the people in the countryside were 'winners' and this is supported by the fact that they benefitted from the barter economy that developed
- Pustau argues that the losers were the working classes and, particularly the middle classes. The impact for the middle classes was indeed devastating as they relied on pensions, fixed incomes and savings. However, the workers were not so badly affected as she argues; they were initially protected from the worst excesses of the hyperinflation because employers agreed with trade unions to index wages to living costs
- Pustau also says that the cause of the hyperinflation was unknown. She mentions that some thought the Jews were a possible cause, and certainly such views would have been encouraged by propaganda from the nationalist right-wing at this time which said that hyperinflation was a Jewish plot to ruin Germany.

Source B: in assessing the value of this source as an explanation, students may refer to the following:

Provenance and tone

- as a member of the NSDAP we would expect Strasser to be against the Weimar Republic's policies. His socialist leanings and views about big business also explain his attack on 'business profiteers'
- Strasser experienced hyperinflation first hand. However, he wrote this in 1947 as part of a book called 'Hitler and I'. His purpose could thus have been to justify subsequent events in Germany, e.g. by saying that 'the future seemed hopeless'
- his tone is one of anger against the government and against foreigners.

Content and argument

- Strasser argues that the economic life of the country was ruined. This is supported by the fact that the value of the mark collapsed so that one dollar was worth 4,200 000 by mid-September 1923
- he comments on the growth in anger, the desperation and the demonstrations. There was indeed widespread discontent leading to political radicalisation and violence; strikes, a communist uprising in Hamburg in October and shootings and civil unrest in a number of towns. The most significant uprising was the Munich Putsch in November 1923
- Strasser talks about the hatred against foreigners who were seen as benefitting from the hyperinflation. This is supported by the tourist profiteering that took place, particularly in border areas.

In arriving at a judgement as to the relative value of each source, students may conclude, e.g. that Source A is more valuable as it gives a non-political commentary from an 'ordinary' German. Conversely, Source B has a more political angle on its analysis of the impact of inflation. However, both complement each other in suggesting how powerless ordinary Germany would have felt and how their anger and frustration could be channelled towards scapegoats. Any supported argument as to relative value should be fully rewarded.

Section B

O2 'Stresemann's foreign policy had done little to improve Germany's international position by 1929.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5: Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment leading to substantiated judgement.

 21-25
- L4: Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be analytical comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance. However, there may be some generalisation and judgements will be limited and only partially substantiated.

 16-20
- L3: The answer will show some understanding of the full demands of the question and the answer will be adequately organised. There will be appropriate information showing an understanding of some key features and/or issues but the answer may be limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some comment in relation to the question.

 11-15
- L2: The answer will be descriptive or partial, showing some awareness of the question but a failure to grasp its full demands. There will be some attempt to convey material in an organised way although communication skills may be limited. There will be some appropriate information showing understanding of some key features and/or issues, but the answer may be very limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some, but limited, comment in relation to the question and statements will, for the most part, be unsupported and generalist.

 6-10
- L1: The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment.

Nothing worthy of credit.

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Indicative content

Note: This content is not prescriptive and students are not obliged to refer to the material contained in this mark scheme. Any legitimate answer will be assessed on its merits according to the generic levels scheme.

Arguments suggesting that Stresemann's foreign policy had done little to improve Germany's international position by 1929 might include:

- key aspects of the Treaty of Versailles remained intact: there had been no discussion about changing German borders or restoring the German minorities in the east, reparation payments remained onerous, military restrictions remained
- the changes Stresemann did achieve were limited, e.g. the early withdrawal of Allied troops from Rhineland was only a minor achievement, later than Stresemann had hoped and subject to French and British demands that withdrawal was linked to continued reparations payments
- France had developed close ties with Poland; this was a military threat against which Germany seemed relatively powerless and left her feeling hemmed in.

Arguments challenging the view that Stresemann's foreign policy had done little to improve Germany's international position by 1929 might include:

- by the Dawes Plan, Germany's economic recovery was now underpinned by US loans in return for accepting an instalment plan for reparations payments, which could not be avoided anyway
- the Locarno Pact (1925) ensured that there could be no repetition of the French invasion of the Ruhr, as had occurred in 1923; Germany's western borders were secure
- Stresemann had not had to confirm Germany's eastern borders; there remained flexibility
 for a potential recovery of lost lands, particularly as the Treaty of Berlin (1926) had bought a
 virtual non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and to a certain extent limited French
 attempts to restrain Germany in the east
- Germany's international reputation had been enhanced by its acceptance into the League of Nations in 1926 as a full member of the Council, and by its participation in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928).

Good answers are likely to argue that although Stresemann had only achieved limited gains by 1929, in fact Germany was much less vulnerable than it had been in 1923 and that there was a much greater feeling of confidence and optimism in Germany about its international standing. It could be argued that Stresemann did as much as could in the international climate that existed at the time and his foreign policy laid the foundations for much of what Hitler achieved in the 1930s.

O3 'Von Schleicher was primarily responsible for Hitler becoming German chancellor in January 1933.'

Explain why you agree or disagree with this view.

[25 marks]

Target: AO1

Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Generic Mark Scheme

- L5: Answers will display a good understanding of the demands of the question. They will be well-organised and effectively communicated. There will be a range of clear and specific supporting information showing a good understanding of key features and issues, together with some conceptual awareness. The answer will be analytical in style with a range of direct comment leading to substantiated judgement.

 21-25
- L4: Answers will show an understanding of the question and will supply a range of largely accurate information which will show an awareness of some of the key issues and features. The answer will be effectively organised and show adequate communication skills. There will be analytical comment in relation to the question and the answer will display some balance. However, there may be some generalisation and judgements will be limited and only partially substantiated.

 16-20
- L3: The answer will show some understanding of the full demands of the question and the answer will be adequately organised. There will be appropriate information showing an understanding of some key features and/or issues but the answer may be limited in scope and/or contain inaccuracy and irrelevance. There will be some comment in relation to the question.

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- L1: The question has not been properly understood and the response shows limited organisational and communication skills. The information conveyed is irrelevant or extremely limited. There may be some unsupported, vague or generalist comment.

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Indicative content

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Arguments suggesting that von Schleicher was primarily responsible for Hitler becoming German chancellor in January 1933 might include:

- as head of the army's political office, the Ministeramt, Schleicher had a lot of influence on Hindenburg and was at the heart of the political intrigues and machinations in the years 1930 to 1933 that led to Hitler's appointment, e.g. he had already influenced the appointment of Brüning in 1930
- he was fundamentally anti-democratic with a reputation for deviousness and arrogance, believing that he was the strong man that Germany needed. He was in discussions with Röhm as early as 1931, promising closer links between the SA and the army as he thought the Nazis could be 'tamed' and 'used' in order further his own ambitions
- Schleicher's actions in 1932–1933 directly led to Hitler getting into office; by replacing von Papen in December 1932, he opened the door to Papen's counter-intrigues that saw Hitler levered into office.

Arguments challenging the view that von Schleicher was primarily responsible for Hitler becoming German chancellor in January 1933 might include:

- it might be argued that long-term factors weakening the Weimar Republic gave the Nazis
 their political opening, which ultimately meant that Hitler could not be ignored as a
 candidate for the chancellorship; such factors as: an unfavourable post-war legacy;
 economic collapse and constitutional weakness; traditional anti-democratic attitudes
- it is also possible to argue that the Nazis themselves skilfully took every opportunity the Republic's weaknesses gave them, making the NSDAP impossible to ignore as the largest party by 1932
- Hitler's obvious personal appeal, promoted heavily by Nazi propaganda, is also another factor, as was Hitler's 'all or nothing' strategy
- other individuals also played prominent roles, notably President Hindenburg, but also von Papen's intrigues in December 1932 and January 1933 were responsible in the short term for overcoming Hindenburg's reservations about appointing the 'Austrian corporal'.

There is no doubt a strong argument to be made that over time Schleicher, pursuing his own personal ambitions and agenda as well as those of the army, must carry a heavy responsibility for undermining democratic accountability and for institutionalising government by intrigue and calculation. There is also no doubt that Schleicher championed Hitler as someone who might do his 'dirty work' for him. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the range of wider factors, both long and short-term, which combined to put Hitler in power. A balanced conclusion might acknowledge Schleicher's key role, but would support a much more multi-causal explanation for Hitler's appointment as chancellor in January 1933.