Cambridge Assessment International Education
Cambridge Pre-U Certificate

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY **9774/03**

Paper 3 Topics on Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 2 **May/June 2019**

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

Published

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Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Table A: Generic Marking Scheme for 10 mark questions

Level 5 9–10 marks	- Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. - Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. - Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. - Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. - Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 7–8 marks	- Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. - Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. - Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. - Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. - Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 5–6 marks	- Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. - Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. - Response is largely relevant to the question asked. - Reasonable attempt to use supporting evidence. - Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 3–4 marks	- Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. - Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. - Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. - Some attempt to use supporting evidence. - Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–2 marks	- Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. - Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. - Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. - Limited attempt to use evidence. - Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	No relevant material to credit.

Table B: Generic Marking Scheme for 15 mark questions

Level 5 13–15 marks	• Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications • of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 10–12 Marks	• Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 7–9 marks	• Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be • sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 4–6 marks	• Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–3 marks	• Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	• No relevant material to credit.

Table C: Generic Marking Scheme for 25 mark questions

Level 5 21–25 marks	• Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 16–20 marks	• Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 12–15 marks	• Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 8–11 marks	• Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.

Level 1 1–7 marks	• Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	• No relevant material to credit.

Question	Answer	Marks
1(a)	**With reference to the above passage, explain Parfit's view that physical continuity is not a necessary condition of personal identity.** The extract comes from chapter 10 of *Reasons and Persons* and finds Parfit addressing the issue of 'what we believe ourselves to be'. The thought experiment, prior to the famous 'Branch Line' case, employs a 'Star Trek' style teletransporter scenario whereby bodily continuity, conceived of as numerical identity over time, ceases: 'the Scanner here on Earth will destroy my brain and body, while recording the exact states of all of my cells'. Parfit's view is that, were we to subscribe to the physical continuity thesis, such a scenario would constitute death, but our 'natural inclination' is to believe we survive: '[a]s she reminded me, she has been often teletransported and there's nothing wrong with her' (albeit in a quantitatively, but not qualitatively distinct form). His earlier qualms: 'I am nervous, will it work?' are conquered, since: '[e]xamining my new body, I find no change at all. Even the cut on my upper lip, from this morning's shave, is still there.' His view, then, is broadly Lockean, inasmuch as what matters is not continuity, but psychological *connectedness*. *Contra* Locke, however, Parfit argues the focus of our attention should be on survival (of persons) rather than continuity through time. Questions about personhood/identity may have no determinate answer; the language of persons admits of degree unlike the logic of identity statements where what is at stake would appear to be an all or nothing affair (i.e. one of 'kind'). Thus, physical/bodily continuity is not a necessary condition of personal identity.	10

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	**Assess Parfit's view that survival rather than identity through time is 'what matters'.**	15
	It would be reasonable, though not essential, for candidates to contextualise Parfit's position via a consideration of some of the wider concerns surrounding personhood and identity. In essence, the issue of what it is that allows us to think of ourselves as one and the same subject of experience in different times and places. Certain 'characteristics' or 'attributes' of personhood might be discussed, some of which are touched upon by Parfit himself.	
	Parfit's own position is reductionist in character inasmuch as there is no 'deep further fact' about personal identity (a person is not a separately existing entity 'distinct from brain and body, and a series of physical and mental events'). What matters is *Relation R*: broadly, psychological *connectedness* and/or continuity with the *right* kind of cause (which, for Parfit, could be *any* cause). Of the two, connectedness is more important since it is *not* a transitive relation. The concept of personal identity should consequently not be conceived of as a 1:1 relation, but rather as a matter of *degree* not of *kind*. Persons are capable of 'surviving' all sorts of qualitative and indeed numerical adjustments and questions concerning the degree of change possible may have no determinate answers. What matters, then, is survival, or a suitable degree of psychological 'connectedness' with former and future selves (references might be made to 'series persons', since the conceptual and empirical possibility of both fission, fusion, commissurotomy and hemispherectomy [etc.] compromise the logic of identity statements). A suitable degree of connectedness (Parfit himself is vague with regards to the extent of this degree) is what 'survival' consists in; 'what matters' and this 'surprisingly natural' way of approaching the issue has substantial implications, not just for how we ought to conceive of ourselves, but also, amongst other phenomena, morality, objects, relationships, places and nation-states. A critical analysis of Parfit's arguments (for example, Williams *et al* – i.e. cases where we might exhibit concern for 'disconnected' future selves but not future connected ones and whether Parfit's 'intuitions' surrounding 'branch-line' cases are warranted? etc.) should also be credited.	

Question	Answer	Marks
2	**Critically assess Functionalism.**	25
	Functionalism, the view that mental states are constituted by their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs, is best understood as a cluster of theories that converge on this point but diverge significantly in other important respects. The point is noteworthy since certain criticisms do not apply universally. For instance, it may well be the case that machine functionalism is liberal but it's hardly the case that teleological functionalism is. In essence, functionalism concerns itself with what mental states *do* rather than *are*. Thus, most versions, above point notwithstanding, remain ontologically neutral with regards the kind of architecture required to run cognition. In humans (and, perhaps, certain species of animal), this architecture is neural, but in hypothetical Martians, and futuristic androids, say, it might be inorganic 'alien goo' or silicon. This 'topic-neutral' view is attractive since it seems to overcome many of the problems facing its reductive and non-reductive predecessors, most notably the issues of location and interaction facing Cartesian dualism; cases of stoicism and successful pretence (behaviourism) and the 'carbon-chauvinism' of type-identity theory. The most prominent variety of functionalism and the one most likely (although not necessarily) to be focused on here is Putnam's 'machine state functionalism': in essence, persons are computationally equivalent to Turing's 'Thinking Machines' (finite state, digitised computers). Other 'functionalisms' which *might* be referred to include analytic functionalism: the semantic view that mental states are to be individuated in terms of 'topic neutral' statements about how one behaves (or does not behave) given certain environmental stimuli and behavioural (or non-behavioural) outputs; Psycho-functionalism: as a branch of cognitive psychology – references might be made to memory 'trace' and 'decay' and teleological functionalism ('teleofunctionalism') which is, broadly speaking, evolutionary in character. Specific strengths and weaknesses of each of these *may* be considered although full marks can be attracted without so doing.

General criticisms of functionalism are likely to focus on *excessive* liberalism (and/or 'the tension between liberalism and chauvinism' – Block); it might also be argued that functionalism (as with computational and representational theories of mind in general) merely replicates the problems it attempts to resolve since it invariably posits processes such as rule following that seem to require the very kind of intelligence the theory itself is supposed to explain (the 'homunculus' objection – 'Blockhead' etc.). More generally, issues are likely to be drawn from cases where functional isomorphism fails (or might be *seen* to fail) to secure phenomenological equivalence. Objections are likely to focus on cases of absent, excessive, inverted, fading or 'dancing' qualia (the introspective elements of sensation: what it *feels* like to be tickled (etc.)) and intentionality (the fact that certain features of our inner life seem to be *about*, *represent* or *stand for* propositions or states of affairs that exist *outside* of it). Expect references to Chinese minds and rooms (and appropriate responses); why there is something about Mary which Fred knew but she didn't and what it is like to be a bat etc. (Chalmers, Jackson, Searle and Block). | |

Question	Answer	Marks
3	**'Others have minds.' Evaluate this claim.** The question is deliberately open in order to prompt a range of discussion. It refers to the problem of other minds, more simply, whether others are minded in the same way that I am and if so how we can come to know this. The mind, unlike the body, it has been argued, is an un-extended entity; private (inasmuch as I alone have access to it); accessed introspectively (unlike the public access we might have to [other] brains and bodily/behavioural states) and, at least from a first person perspective, indubitable (I can doubt, for example, the cause of my pain, but not the pain itself). Minds, thus conceived, are 'ghostly' substances that exist independently of the physical 'shells' or 'machines' they haunt. This view leads to the immediate (perceived) threat of solipsism: that all I can know for sure is my own mind and its contents. Solipsism is widely regarded as a problem that needs surmounting rather than a position that should be genuinely endorsed (although candidates may well query this). A range of arguments have been advanced in order to do just this; some perspicuously more successful than others. Candidates may critically discuss *some* of the following, or equivalent points: • Mill's 'Argument from Analogy': I have immediate and unmediated access to my own mental state (say pain) and am aware of the environmental stimulus (for example the stubbing of my toe) that occasions it and the behavioural manifestation (the subsequent expletive!) that itself so occasions. The latter of these are public. I therefore analogously move from my own case to the case of others and infer in them the same inner state that I myself possess. • Wittgenstein's 'Private Language Argument': the concepts we use to identify and individuate our own inner mental episodes are public, not private. They apply equally to others as they do to ourselves and there is thus no asymmetry between self and other-ascription. • Strawson's, broadly 'Kantian' approach. The notion of personhood, he argues, is 'logically primitive'. It is a basic feature of our conceptual framework. The concept, thus regarded, is a fundamental presupposition of our ascribing both 'm' (psychological) and 'p' (behavioural) predicates to ourselves and to others although in others, such ascriptions have to be behavioural in character. • Other attempted rebuttals might be reductive in character so that, if mental states are reducible to brain states, then the problem of other minds becomes the problem of other brains (thus bringing the issue into the empirical domain). Discussions might also refer to behavioural dispositions and/or functional isomorphism and whether or not the 'apparently' irreducible features of consciousness (namely qualia and intentionality) can be so reduced without the charge of circularity. It would also be reasonable for candidates to take on an eliminative stance so that the problem itself dissolves, or at least will be linguistically eliminated alongside the elimination of other minds in general (the view is contentious). Other views might also be critically considered.	25

Question	Answer	Marks
4(a)	**With reference to the above passage, explain what Sartre means when he claims: 'In fashioning myself I fashion man.'** Sartre is deeply suspicious of any account of moral objectivity (the 'spirit of seriousness'/'conventional morality') but his account should not be regarded as nihilistic (his 'considerations' do not 'exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation'). In the absence of God, and the presence of absolute freedom (since 'existence precedes essence'), the need for an existentialist ethic, particularly so given the historical context of the work, has never been more pressing and demands that we take a certain attitude towards the world in spite of the above 'embarrassments'. Whatever that attitude might be, it concerns not just ourselves, but all mankind ('[r]esignation is my will for everyone'). The concept of bad faith ('self-deception'/'inauthenticity' – *mauvaise foi*) is important here (expect references to 'cowards' and 'scum') as it approximates to an evasion of the responsibility that freedom bestows upon us, the full extent of which ('our responsibility is thus much greater than we had supposed') leads to 'anguish' (the realisation that we are not just responsible for *ourselves*, but 'mankind as a whole'), 'abandonment' and 'despair'. This in turn leads many (for example Sartre's 'priest') to live inauthentically: those who 'flee from freedom'; accuse the emotions, determinism or personal circumstance as being responsible for their actions; follow 'signs', counsel or moral objectivity (God given or otherwise) etc. An 'authentic' existence, contrarily, places freedom and self-government at the very heart of an existentialist ethic. Such freedom, we are told, transcends individual liberty (expect references to 'intersubjectivity') since without valuing the liberty of others, the very sanctity of freedom (including my own) breaks down. Sartre's first account of an existentialist morality, then, appeals to the principle of universalisability, more simply, when we choose, we choose for humanity at large: 'I am thus responsible for myself and for all men'. Freedom, then, underpins value and a value for one is a value for all (were it not, it would not be of any moral worth). Thus: '[i]n fashioning myself I fashion man'.	10

Question	Answer	Marks
4(b)	**'Sartre's existentialist ethics is unconvincing.' Evaluate this claim.** There is something clearly commendable about Sartre's account. The emphasis placed on such values as autonomy and the potential for self-creation hold intuitive moral weight and there is clearly an intrinsic relation between freedom (should it exist), choice and responsibility which should not be discredited. Nonetheless, it has attracted criticisms both from and on a range of fronts, some of which are considered and responded to by Sartre himself (this was the *aim* of *E&H*). For example, the charge that existentialism is a 'pessimistic' doctrine, leading to 'quietism and despair'; emphasises the 'uglier' side of life; 'isolates the individual' and leads to 'amorality' and 'anarchy' (etc.). The varying success of Sartre's responses to these points might be considered, as might the issue of whether we are as free as Sartre contends? More specific criticisms might focus on the tension between Sartrean and deontological ethics. Whilst deriding any attempt at a 'secular morality' (here we would include pointedly directed comments towards Kant himself), his work does appear to bear more than a passing resemblance to Kantian deontology, most notably his appeal to the principle of universalisability. Issues surrounding this principle itself are also likely to be discussed: whether, for example, responsibility for self actually excludes responsibility for others (and/or vice versa)? Whether the notion of responsibility for others is intelligible (inasmuch as we do not/*could* not 'choose' the choices others make for themselves)? It is also not at all clear that our individual choices (including 'moral' ones) *are* ones which we would have universalised (for example, vegetarianism) nor that universalisation itself is any guarantee of moral worth (a range of universalisable but non-moral or morally abhorrent 'extreme' examples from history, politics and religion are likely to be given here). Given the synoptic nature of the course, it is likely that candidates will draw on other material selected for study so that religious, normative and meta-ethical critiques may be used to judge the relative success of Sartre's account, all of which, if relevant, should be credited. Also, the extent to which his account can be seen to offer practical guidance within the field of applied ethics (again, his 'student' example is of particular significance here).	15

Question	Answer	Marks
5	**'Kant's theory of duty is too rigid to guide moral action.' Discuss the extent to which you agree with this claim.**	25
	The area identified in the question is Kantian deontology. Eschewing any (allegedly) objective account of 'the good for man' present in earlier and more modern formulations of virtue theory and more subjective claims about the good (such as the pursuit of pleasure/avoidance of pain, happiness, preference, satisfaction etc. associated with utilitarianism – since both such accounts compromise moral agency), Kant's approach to ethics stems from his initial assertion that nothing is unconditionally good except the universal *good will*. Thus, Kant's focus is on the motives and intentions behind moral action rather than the moral outcome such actions generate (positive or otherwise): *'act only on that maxim that you can at the same time will to be a universal law of human nature'*. This is known as 'the formula of universal law'. He develops this distinction with his notion of imperfect (for example helping others) and perfect duties (for example, promise keeping and truth telling) to oneself and others: perfect duties being the only ones which are formally binding. Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative (the formula of 'the end in itself'): *'[s]o act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end'* has significant moral credence given the more concrete implications of this demand for respect for persons (there are, of course, clearly non-moral cases where the hypothetical imperative still applies).	
	Argumentation for the view (that Kant's account 'is too rigid to guide moral action') *may* refer to some of the following points:	
	• The charge of formalism. This is the claim that the purely 'formal' categorical imperative identifies no *specific* deontological principles.	
	• Conversely, some claim that Kant's ethical theory – far from being empty and formalistic – leads to rigidly insensitive rules. There could be situations where, for example, truth-telling could be damaging whilst at the same time serving no obvious moral purpose (his 'axeman' example is likely to feature here).	
	• A third criticism concerns the idea that Kant's categorical imperatives are too abstract to guide actions. For example, a teacher is committed to treating his pupils as ends-in-themselves. He sets a homework essay on Kant's ethics. Half of the pupils score less than 10/25. What should he do? Make them do it again? Give them extra help? Punish them?	
	• Also, do inclinations, sympathies etc. have no moral worth at all (again, a wide array of examples might be examined here – for example, the father that does right for his child out of love rather than duty)?	
	• Finally, Kant's main focus is on distinguishing moral actions and motives from non-moral actions and motives. Don't we also need an account of immorality?	
	A range of other points might be considered, all of which, if relevant, should be credited.	

Question	Answer	Marks
6	**'There is no such thing as a just war.' Discuss this claim with reference to ethical theories you have studied.** The question is permissive so expect a wide range of discussion. It is also plural ('theories') so candidates will need to consider some of the ethical implications of just war theory from at least **two** normative perspectives (deontological, utilitarian and/or virtuosic). Meta-ethical and/or linguistic issues might also be referred to so that the question of whether the concept of a 'just war' is meaningful and if so, in virtue of *what* would also be pertinent. The most likely candidate to be selected for discussion will be the 'traditionalist' account of JWT given by Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica.* Aquinas' initial concerns lay with the stipulation of a set of criteria which, if met, would constitute adequate (i.e. individually necessary and collectively sufficient) grounds for 'the right to war' (*'jus ad bellum'*). A consideration of *jus in bello* (justice *in* war)*,* concerning the rules of conduct that must be adhered to and *jus post bellum* (justice *post* war) which dictate the (non-Draconian) punitive measures that might subsequently (and rightfully) be enforced would also be relevant. Critical discussions of any of the above points *and others* should be credited. For example: • Utilitarianism (some might reference Bentham, Mill and Singer *et al* and felicific calculi, act, rule, preference, negative, positive, and ideal accounts of the principle of utility) would judge the validity of such action (and its repercussions) consequentially. But what is to be calculated and by whom, how and why? Outcomes are notoriously difficult to predict and arguably even harder to quantify once secured. • Deontologists would conversely hold that just *cause* and the right *intention* ought to be the only determining factor. Issues might borrow from the charges of 'formalism', moral insensitivity and 'emptiness'; conflicting duties (and how they are to be interpreted) and whether deontology undervalues the notion of consequence which, at least at a practical level, appears to vindicate most acts of war, just or otherwise. • Virtue theory (expect references to Aristotle, Anscombe, Williams and MacIntyre and concepts such as cardinal (temperance, courage, wisdom and justice) intellectual (for example, theoretical and practical wisdom) and moral (kindness and generosity etc.) virtue, eudaemonia and the doctrine of the mean appears to contain both utilitarian and deontological strands. There is, however, pervasive disagreement with regards the virtues themselves and the extent to which these virtues conflict (for instance, courage and empathy). A range of other relevant points should also be credited. For example, divine command theory and natural moral law, Sartrean existentialist ethics, situational ethics, realism, pacifism (the view that *any* act of violence is unjustifiable and that all disputes should be settled non-aggressively), revisionism, holy wars, the treatment of civilians, prisoners of war, torture, genocide, child soldiers and of course the issue of peace amongst others. In essence, given the expansive nature of the theme, it is important that *any* relevant material should be credited, not just that referred to above (although a response which fails to reference *any* of these points is unlikely to score highly).	25

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	**Examine the meaning of this passage in Hosea's prophecy.** Candidates are likely to provide some background to the story of Hosea and his wife, for example the view that Gomer may have been a cultic prostitute, and Hosea himself may have been operating within the cult. The message from God in v.2 draws a parallel between Gomer's unfaithfulness to Hosea and that of Israel to God. The birth of Jezreel ('God sows') points back to the sin of the house of Jehu (1 Kings 19; 2 Kings 9–10) and forward to the restoration of Israel. The name of the second child ('Not pitied') signifies Yahweh's lack of pity for Israel, symbolised further by Yahweh's rejection of the covenant relationship with Israel ('Not my people'). In verses 10–11 and 2:1, the tone changes – God's discipline of Israel is followed by the promise of an expansion of population. Some may refer to the further cycle of disciplinary action threatened in 2:2–13, followed by the promise of redemption in vv.14–23; and further to the restoration of the adulterous wife (who may or may not be Gomer) in 3:1–5. It is a matter of some dispute as to whether this material is allegorical, metaphorical or literal, for example.	10
7(b)	**Critically examine the message of God's love in the Book of Hosea.** There are many themes that candidates might address here, for example: the value of personal experience as a means of communicating God's word, and particularly the idea of unrequited love, which in both Hosea and God is met with continued love rather than by judgement. 'Love' in the Book of Hosea is ḥeseḏ, and refers in particular to Yahweh's love for Israel: Yahweh is 'God, not man'. In addition to the metaphor of God's love as the husband of Israel, God is also portrayed as the loving father who protects his wayward son and eventually redeems him. Some might compare this with Jesus' *agapeic* love in the New Testament. Hosea's love for Gomer is described in similar terms: his (albeit human rather than divine) love for Gomer means that after a period of isolation, Hosea's love means that he takes her back. Some might suggest that the marriage story is part of Hosea's 'call narrative', so that it was formative in his attitude and message, demonstrating the balance of love against judgement. Hosea dealt with other themes aside from love, such as judgement, isolation and punishment, but even here it can be argued that these are a necessary part of love. The whole narrative in Hosea can be seen against the religious apostasy of the Baal cult, and the various political alliances by which Israel tried to survive destruction. Some might question the value of divine love which appears to be conditional rather than unconditional. Some might reject the Gomer/wife material as an unlikely invention, particularly the idea of marriage to a prostitute.	15

Question	Answer	Marks
8	**'There was no difference between true and false prophets in ancient Israel.' Evaluate this claim.** There are several criteria that might be used to discuss this question. For example, it is often held that false prophets worked in the cult whereas true prophets did not. This is clearly untrue, since Isaiah was called in the temple, Hosea may have been a cultic prophet, and Moses and Samuel both have cultic functions, for example. Equally, it is not possible to hold that false prophets worked in the king's court and flattered the king while true prophets criticised kings from outside the court: Nathan was a court prophet, and many of the prophets were clearly not strangers to court life (e.g. Isaiah, Jeremiah and Amos). The 'classic' description of false prophets comes from Jeremiah, who says that false prophets were deceivers, were not sent by Yahweh, prophesied lies in Yahweh's name, and were immoral. Perhaps these things were true, but if so, the deception was evidently good enough to deceive most people. Equally unclear is the claim that true prophets were called but false prophets were not: this issue is complicated by the 1 Kings 22 narrative of Micaiah ben Imlah, which is evidently explaining false prophecy by suggesting that it is controlled by Yahweh, who summons a 'lying spirit of prophecy' to deceive Ahab, which in turn suggests that 'false' prophecy here is actually as 'true' as 'true' prophecy. Similar problems exist with the claim that true prophets always prophesied doom (Isaiah used salvation oracles), or that true prophets always used the messenger formulae of 'Thus says Yahweh', and 'Oracle of Yahweh' (they were also used by false prophets (e.g. Jer. 23:31). Any or all of these points could be used to make a positive or negative response to the question, so judge by quality of argument.	25

Question	Answer	Marks
9	**Critically examine the significance of miracles in Old Testament prophecy.** Miracles figured alongside a variety of techniques used by the Old Testament prophets to illustrate their messages, e.g. signs, spoken oracles, written oracles and symbolic acts. The particular significance of miracles was in their demonstration of God's power. Candidates are likely to illustrate this with reference to the miracles of Moses and Elijah: for the former, in particular, the miracles associated with the escape of the Hebrew slaves from captivity in Egypt and the wilderness period that followed; for the latter, Elijah's contest with the prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel, and his miraculous ascension to heaven. For Elijah, these were so important that he became *the* prophet of Jewish tradition, and some of Jesus' miracles recalled to the people the power of Elijah (e.g. the raising of the widow of Nain's son; also the Transfiguration of Jesus, where Elijah appears as the representative of Prophecy). Both Elijah and Elisha are credited with raising people from the dead, and clearly such miracles were used in order to convince people of the power of Yahweh over any other gods. They also have an ethical perspective, in so far as the giving of the Ten Commandments to Moses marks the absolute nature of the Law. Judge in terms of how far answers illustrate the 'significance' of miracles in Old Testament prophecy as opposed to simply telling the stories. Some might argue that the miraculous is central to the OT (and NT) world view of God's intervention on behalf of humanity; others might see miracles as of minor importance compared with the ethical teachings. A 21st-century viewpoint might argue that miracles are literary devices to emphasise God's power, but have no literal significance.	25