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PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY **9774/03**

Paper 3 Topics and Key Texts in Philosophy and Theology 2 **October/November 2020**

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 50

Published

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

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Generic Marking Principles

These general marking principles must be applied by all examiners when marking candidate answers. They should be applied alongside the specific content of the mark scheme or generic level descriptors for a question. Each question paper and mark scheme will also comply with these marking principles.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 1:

Marks must be awarded in line with:

- the specific content of the mark scheme or the generic level descriptors for the question
- the specific skills defined in the mark scheme or in the generic level descriptors for the question
- the standard of response required by a candidate as exemplified by the standardisation scripts.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 2:

Marks awarded are always **whole marks** (not half marks, or other fractions).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 3:

Marks must be awarded **positively**:

- marks are awarded for correct/valid answers, as defined in the mark scheme. However, credit is given for valid answers which go beyond the scope of the syllabus and mark scheme, referring to your Team Leader as appropriate
- marks are awarded when candidates clearly demonstrate what they know and can do
- marks are not deducted for errors
- marks are not deducted for omissions
- answers should only be judged on the quality of spelling, punctuation and grammar when these features are specifically assessed by the question as indicated by the mark scheme. The meaning, however, should be unambiguous.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 4:

Rules must be applied consistently, e.g. in situations where candidates have not followed instructions or in the application of generic level descriptors.

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 5:

Marks should be awarded using the full range of marks defined in the mark scheme for the question (however; the use of the full mark range may be limited according to the quality of the candidate responses seen).

GENERIC MARKING PRINCIPLE 6:

Marks awarded are based solely on the requirements as defined in the mark scheme. Marks should not be awarded with grade thresholds or grade descriptors in mind.

Assessment objectives (AOs)

AO1	Demonstrate knowledge and understanding; identify, select and apply ideas and concepts through the use of examples and evidence.	40%
AO2	Provide a systematic critical analysis of the texts and theories, sustain a line of argument and justify a point of view. Different views should be referred to and evaluated where appropriate. Demonstrate a synoptic approach to the areas studied.	60%

In the textual questions AO1 and AO2 are assessed separately.

AO1 and AO2 are both to be considered in assessing each essay.

The **Generic Marking Scheme** should be used to decide the mark. The essay should first be placed within a level which best describes its qualities, and then at a specific point within that level to determine a mark out of 25.

The **Question-Specific Notes** provide guidance for Examiners as to the area covered by the question. These question-specific notes are not exhaustive. Candidates may answer the question from a variety of angles with different emphases and using different supporting evidence and knowledge for which they receive credit according to the Generic Marking Scheme levels. However, candidates must clearly answer the question as set and not their own question. Examiners are reminded that the insights of specific religious traditions are, of course, relevant, and it is likely that candidates will draw on the views of Jewish, Christian or Islamic theologians, as well as those of philosophers who have written about the concept of God from a purely philosophical standpoint. There is nothing to prevent candidates referring to other religious traditions and these must, of course, be credited appropriately in examination responses.

Table A: Generic Marking Scheme for 10 mark questions

Level 5 9–10 marks	• Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 7–8 marks	• Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 5–6 marks	• Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Reasonable attempt to use supporting evidence. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 3–4 marks	• Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–2 marks	• Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	• No relevant material to credit.

Table B: Generic Marking Scheme for 15 mark questions

Level 5 13–15 marks	• Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 10–12 marks	• Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 7–9 marks	• Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 4–6 marks	• Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–3 marks	• Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	• No relevant material to credit.

Table C: Generic Marking Scheme for 25 mark questions

Level 5 21–25 marks	• Broad knowledge and understanding of a wide range of philosophical/religious issues. • Insightful selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Excellent critical engagement and detailed evaluation of the wider implications of the question. • Complete or near complete accuracy at this level. • Argument is coherent, structured, developed and convincingly sustained. • Employs a wide range of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Good evidence of wide reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows good understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Confident and precise use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 4 16–20 marks	• Knowledge is accurate and a good range of philosophical/religious issues are considered. • Systematic/good selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Good critical engagement and evaluation of the implications of the question. • Response is accurate: the question is answered specifically. • Argument has structure and development and is sustained. • Good use of differing points of view and supporting evidence. • Some evidence of reading on the topic beyond the set texts. • Shows competent understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Accurate use of philosophical and theological vocabulary.
Level 3 12–15 marks	• Knowledge is generally accurate and a fair range of issues are considered. • Reasonable selection and application of ideas and concepts. • Some critical engagement and evaluation of the question. • Response is largely relevant to the question asked. • Argument has some structure and shows some development, but may not be sustained. • Considers more than one point of view and uses evidence to support argument. • May show some understanding of the links between different areas of study where appropriate. • Reasonable attempt to use philosophical and theological vocabulary accurately.
Level 2 8–11 marks	• Some accuracy of knowledge. More than one issue is touched upon. • Attempts to select and apply ideas with partial success. • Attempts to evaluate though with partial success. • Response is partially relevant to the question asked but may be one-sided. • Some attempt at argument but without development and coherence. • Some attempt to use supporting evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is occasionally used correctly.
Level 1 1–7 marks	• Some key points made. Possibly repetitive or short. • Explores some isolated ideas related to the general topic. • Argument is limited or confused. • Response is limited or tenuously linked to the question. • Limited attempt to use evidence. • Philosophical and theological vocabulary is inaccurate or absent.
Level 0 0 marks	• No relevant material to credit.

Question	Answer	Marks
1(a)	**With reference to this passage, explain the point of Searle's argument.** The extract is taken from chapter 2 and finds Searle addressing the question 'can computers think?' He does so with his now famous 'Chinese Room' thought experiment. Having argued for a biological conception of consciousness, it is not surprising he wishes to reject the 'prevailing view' (strong AI) that intelligence is just a matter of physical symbol manipulation. The operations of a digital computer, Searle argues, are purely formal/syntactic but there is more to mindedness than this. Mental states possess certain irreducible features (intentionality/'aboutness'/semantics) which computational processes lack. The CR argument is meant to demonstrate this. A computer programme is able to *simulate* without *genuinely* understanding Chinese (which Searle refers to as 'as if' understanding). The man inside the room is a native English speaker with no understanding of Chinese, he is merely 'following instructions'. Now, to a Chinese speaking outside observer it would appear that the man inside the room possesses a genuine understanding of Chinese which is clearly wrong. He understands the instructions used to *manipulate* the symbols (squiggles and squoggles) but remains ignorant as to their *meaning*. His conversational response does not possess intentionality, does not mean anything and is not 'about' anything. Searle's point is that a computer has syntax but not semantics. From the perspective of the man inside the room: 'you behave exactly as if you understood Chinese, but all the same you don't understand a word of Chinese'.	**10**

Question	Answer	Marks
1(b)	**Critically assess Searle's view that there is more to understanding Chinese than 'the implementing of a formal computer program'.** It would be reasonable for candidates to address the issue from the wider perspective of Searle's own biological naturalism or the limitations of functionalism in general, however, full marks can be achieved without doing so. Students may well consider some of the standard replies to the argument (the 'system' and 'robot' response etc.) which Searle himself plausibly rejects. In essence, no computer programme by itself can sufficiently implement mindedness. The main thrust of Searle's argument is to be found in chapter 3 where he argues against cognitivism in general. There are several stages to his argument which might be critically considered. First, cognitivism is tempting since we do not understand the brain very well and are liable to refer to the latest technologies in order to explain it (references might be made to Leibniz' mill; Freud's hydraulic systems and early 20th Century comparisons with telephone switchboards etc.). It is no coincidence that we now compare the brain to artificial systems (robots and computers). Second, comparisons can be drawn between the respective reaction times of computers and minds when performing different intellectual tasks. Third, the formal rules of computation mimic the formal syntax of 'deep grammar' and finally, the most powerful analogy of cognition we currently run with compares the mind ('software') to the brain ('hardware'). None of these points Searle finds attractive and whilst he accepts cognitivism cannot be 'disproved', he nevertheless finds such arguments 'very weak'. For one, the intentional element of rule-following plays a causal role in determining our behaviour and in this respect, 'computers don't follow rules at all' since the programme itself is what determines the steps to be taken ('as if' intentionality). When humans process information they are consciously engaged with it whereas computers only mimic this process ('simulation' is not the same as 'duplication'). Cognitivism thus overlooks the psychological element of cognition; computational processes are purely mechanical, and a functional analysis could be applied to any purely physical process (water flowing down the contours of a hill etc.). It is also false to assume that an internal theory is required to explain *all* meaningful behaviour since our inability to perceive infra-red, for example, can be explained in purely physiological terms (i.e. without the need for functional instruction – 'do not perceive infra-redly' etc.). Thus, Searle concludes, human behaviour can only be explained in neurophysiological and intentional terms, not computational ones. A critical awareness of some of the above issues should be credited as should an awareness of some of the wider issues surrounding Searle's biological naturalism and functionalism in general, for example, given recent advances in computation and AI, we might have grounds for future optimism with regards machine intelligence, although responses that refer solely to the irreducibility of consciousness without considering specific features such as intentionality and rule-following are unlikely to score highly.	**15**

Question	Answer	Marks
2	**‘Identity consists in psychological continuity through time.’ Critically assess this claim.** The position is most likely to be identified with Locke’s view that ‘consciousness alone makes self’. It would be reasonable, though not essential, for candidates to contextualise the position that identity consists in psychological continuity through time, via a consideration of some of the wider concerns surrounding personhood and identity. In essence, the issue of what it is that allows us to think of ourselves as one and the same subject of experience in different times and places. Certain ‘characteristics’ or ‘attributes’ might be discussed so that personhood might be identified with the possession of a rational soul and network of beliefs, embodiment, sociability, autonomy and the capacity for self-creation; self-awareness and awareness of oneself as a continuing subject of experience; creativity, responsibility, accountability and the possession of rights in virtue of this; language use and so forth. But what is it that secures these qualities? The two standard responses to this question, are physical (or bodily/brain) and psychological continuity. More simply, what secures our continuing identity through time is memory (which *might* require brain-continuity) or the [potential for a] mapping out of our spatiotemporal co-ordinates between T1 and T*n* (it needs noting that physical continuity does *not* require immutability although the question of the degree of change possible is an interesting one) or some combination of the two. It is likely that candidates will refer to some of the standard thought experiments within the literature to argue for or against this view (some might consider their own or modified versions of the above), that have been employed by the likes of Locke, Williams, Shoemaker, Lewis, Glover and Parfit so expect references to princes and cobblers, memory loss (and the breaching of the law of causal transitivity [Reid]), fugue amnesia, multiple-personality disorder, split brains, fusion, fission, teletransportation, ‘branching cases’ and ‘Freaky Fridays’ etc. Such examples should be used to test the individual necessity and joint sufficiency of competing accounts of what exactly it is that our personal identity is annexed to but focus needs to be directed at psychological, rather than physical continuity and / or connectedness through time. Credit any reasonable line of argumentation.	**25**

Question	Answer	Marks
3	**Evaluate the 'hard problem' of consciousness.** The question is quite permissive so that a wide range of responses should be credited. In essence, the 'hard' problem of consciousness comes about when we try and explain the emergence of the phenomenological properties of conscious states: how the 'water of the brain' turns into the 'wine of consciousness' (Chalmers). There is 'something it is like' to be conscious that a scientific analysis of the functional / dynamic / structural properties of the brain will always leave untreated, most notably qualia (the intrinsic, non-representational features of conscious experience – what it *feels* like) and intentionality (it's extrinsic features – that consciousness is 'about' stuff). Mentality, on this view, resists ontological reduction. An explanation of the issue will most likely be rooted in Chalmers (expect reference to zombies – functional duplicates without consciousness); Nagel's account of subjectivity ('bats' and 'views from nowhere') and/or Levine on explanatory 'gaps'. It would also be reasonable to approach the issue via some of the standard thought experiments in the literature such as the knowledge argument (Chalmers/Jackson – possibly Descartes – why there is 'something about Mary' which Fred knew but she didn't etc.) and Searle's Chinese Room or via a discussion of some of the inherent features of consciousness (Searle) which minds possess but brains don't. Such features are usually used to defend some form of non-reductionism (property dualism / epiphenomenalism / biological naturalism / anomalous monism / supervenience etc.) on the grounds that consciousness is ultimately irreducible. Substance dualism would also be relevant here: perhaps, for example, we don't know 'how', but we know 'that'. Whilst it is important candidates do not lose sight of the question, some might argue that reduction or elimination provides a more effective strategy for dealing with the problem and so might refer to other positions studied which is fine, although responses which merely list alternative positions are unlikely to score highly. Credit any reasonable line of argumentation.	**25**

Question	Answer	Marks
4(a)	**With reference to this passage, explain Mill's argument that it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to depend on 'quantity alone'.** It would be reasonable, though not essential, to contextualise Mill's position against some of the issues confronting its 'crude' predecessor (Benthamite/hedonic utilitarianism and the felicific calculus: a doctrine 'worthy only of swine'). Part of this doctrine Mill accepts – that happiness consists in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain (the principle of utility) but deviates from it on the grounds that there are qualitative differences between pleasures that render some more valuable than others (all things being equal, pushpin is *not* equal to poetry: 'it is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others'). Thus, Bentham fails to discriminate between different types of happiness / pleasure; quality and quantity: 'human beings have higher faculties than the animal appetites'. This leads Mill to separate the 'higher' from the 'lower' pleasures: 'every Epicurean theory of life that we know of assigns to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination and of the moral sentiments a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation'. Higher pleasures are, broadly conceived, those of the intellect (reading a good book; watching a Shakespeare play; listening to Wagner; studying philosophy etc. – Mill is not very specific) and lower, those of the body (food, drink and sex etc.). Given that the former is more precious than the latter: 'it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to depend on quantity alone', Mill's position is compatible with the view that the life of a dissatisfied Socrates is better than a satisfied pig, a judgement Bentham was not entitled to. Top band responses will need to focus on the specific nuances of the question (quality vs quantity; higher and lower pleasures).	**10**

Question	Answer	Marks
4(b)	**‘Mental pleasures are better than bodily ones.’ Critically assess this view.** Again, it would be reasonable to embed a response to this question within Mill’s wider account of the principle of utility and / or hedonic utilitarianism, but the issue of mental (higher) and bodily (lower) pleasures needs addressing in order to access the higher end of the mark scheme. Stronger responses should explain exactly what Mill has in mind here and why the distinction needs reinforcing if utilitarianism is to be defended against the charge of its being a doctrine of swine. General criticisms of Mill’s approach should be rewarded, but top band responses will need to display a critical awareness of whether or not Mill’s distinction works. For example, whether the distinction is as clear as Mill makes out – is the appreciation of fine wine, for example, a higher or a lower pleasure and where, if at all, should we draw the line? Is the distinction consistent? The moral prioritisation of a dissatisfied Socrates over a satisfied fool seems to be at odds with the general principle of utility. Is pleasure – higher or lower – quantifiable? Is his appeal to ‘competent judges’ coherent / circular / elitist? Does he downgrade the value of the lower pleasures? Might other notions, such as those advanced in ideal and preference utilitarianism (etc.) offer a more compelling account of the principle? It might be argued that pleasure in *any* form needs divorcing from the sphere of moral enquiry (Kant).	**15**

Question	Answer	Marks
5	**Evaluate virtue ethics.** Given that candidates will have studied foundational debate 1 in the first year, an explanation of virtue is likely to be given via Aristotle's archer analogy and / or Plato's charioteer both of which emphasise the importance of moral character in the ethical decision-making process. A virtuous act is thus one undertaken by the virtuous character and moral progress is to be measured against the cultivation of certain virtuous traits, characteristics or dispositions to the extent that they allow us to live a good life. VE, then, unlike its utilitarian and deontological counterparts (which appeal to the principle of utility and the categorical imperative) is 'agent-centred'. Responses might be grounded in Plato, in which case, expect references to the Good; the allegory of the cave, his tripartite analysis of soul and the role of the charioteer. Most candidates will probably focus on Aristotle, in which case, expect reference to his account of causation (most importantly causes 2 and 4 – goodness identified as that which allows an object / person to perform its function well); the rational soul (as advanced in *De Anima*); moral / cardinal (prudence, temperance, courage and justice – *NE II=V*) and intellectual (theoretical, practical and productive / *Sophia, phronesis and techne* – *VI*) virtue / *arete,* the latter of which can be taught whilst the former only acquired by practice; the doctrine of the mean; the 'highest good (*Eudaimonia* – not to be confused with happiness or pleasure); the role of habit; the function of moral exemplars in cultivating the virtues; voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary behaviour and his archer analogy. Arguments for the above positions are likely to draw on the importance of agency, flourishing and self-actualisation (the importance of which Aristotle regards as self-evident) and moral flexibility (some may query this). Arguments against might focus on the lack of moral guidance virtue theory offers on specific occasions; the 'circularity' objection (is a person virtuous because of their actions or their actions virtuous because of the person); conflicting virtues; moral 'luck'; Nietzsche, and whether VE leads to a life of 'mediocrity' and issues surrounding moral absolutism and relativism. It is generally accepted that Aristotle and certainly Plato endorse the former approach, but some might query this. It is generally accepted that the modern resurgence of this approach to ethics is a strength of the view. Given this, some candidates may choose to focus on modern formulations of VE which is fine and full marks can be attracted for doing so, so that references might be made to Anscombe (and the need to re-connect virtue with actual needs and desires in the absence of a moral 'law-giver' – notions such as duty and obligation are 'anchorless children') and Macintyre (the cultural relativity of virtue and the importance of 'narrative unity'). Foot, Nussbaum, Williams and Hursthouse *et al* might also be critically considered here. Full marks can be achieved for those that root a response entirely in the ancient tradition although responses that bring the debate into the 20th Century should be rewarded for doing so. Candidates may well contrast the view with other normative approaches, although care needs to be taken to address the specific demands of the question. Credit any reasonable line of argumentation.	**25**

Question	Answer	Marks
6	**'Natural Law is successful in helping us make decisions about environmental ethics.' Critically assess this claim.** The question is quite open but, candidates should address both issues identified in the question stem in order to show whether or not NML can be successfully applied to issues surrounding environmental ethics. It would not, for example, be enough for a candidate to state that, given that Aquinas was writing almost a thousand years ago, and that environmental ethics is a relatively modern affair he 'has little to say on the issue' (perhaps coupled with an explanation of why alternative accounts might fare better – this would be tangential). Likewise, an explanation of NML on its own, unless applied to EE (and vice versa), as with any other variant, would not address the question. Candidates might begin by explaining NML, but it would be reasonable to do so via Aristotle and / or Divine Command Theory. In essence, Aquinas argues, God made us rational creatures and as such, we both *know* and *desire* what is good without the need for divine intervention (expect reference to *synderesis* – 'right instinct' to do good and avoid evil and *conscientia* – 'right reason' which allows us to distinguish right from wrong when making moral decisions). In accordance with our nature, there are certain 'basic goods' ('primary precepts') that we all look to procure, the most important of which is self-preservation, but also the need to reproduce; educate; live in a well-ordered society and worship God. From these, a further set of secondary precepts can be derived which contribute to the securing of such goods. This last point is noteworthy since it allows for a degree of moral flexibility (candidates might refer to revisionism here) when interpreting the primary precepts that paves the way for more modern formulations of NML. Candidates need to critically apply NML to issues surrounding environmental ethics so that, whilst an internal critique of Aquinas' views would be relevant, what is more important is how a candidate critically applies these views to some of the normative issues facing our ethical relationship with the natural environment (which presumably God created to be populated by humankind). Such issues are legion and cannot be treated here but expect references to anthropocentrism; biodiversity; climate change; overpopulation and our duty to future generations; deforestation; pollution; ecology; extinction of species; space and 'planetary boundaries' (etc.), all of which, it might be argued, contravene the primary precept and undermine notions of living in a well-ordered society and our obligation to promote environmental preservation. Credit any reasonable line of argumentation.	**25**

Question	Answer	Marks
7(a)	**Examine the meaning and purpose of this passage in relation to the Book of Amos as a whole.** These verses constitute the ending of the Book of Amos. They are in the form of two salvation oracles (9:11–12 and 9:13–15), in marked contrast to the preceding chapters, which are largely oracles of doom. Verse 11 announces that Yahweh will raise up the fallen booth of David, meaning that the Davidic dynasty will be restored. It suggests that David's kingdom is in ruins, and that the ruins will be rebuilt, and the surrounding territories will be returned to Judean control. The situation supposes the Babylonian destruction of Judah in the 6th Century BCE: the reference to the 'remnant of Edom' (v.12) assumes that Edom had also been invaded and decimated by the Babylonians in the 6th Century BCE, and that Edom would be the first territory to be restored to Judean control. Verses 12–14 point to a time when agricultural prosperity would be restored to the extent that ploughing and reaping (along with wine production) would follow each other in quick succession. The fertility of the land was a symbol of God's blessing, and the final/ultimate blessing is that the people of Israel/Judah will never again be 'plucked up' from their land. The purpose of these oracles is disputed. Some argue that at the last, Amos felt that he had to give some promise for the future in order to make sense of God's promise to David that his kingdom would last for ever (2 Sam. 7:13). Others argue that the oracles are from a disciple of Amos who was concerned to balance doom with the idea of final salvation. Another view is that the Book of the Twelve (the so-called 'Minor Prophets') was edited as a prophetic collection in order to give assurance and hope in the wake of the destruction and terror caused by the Babylonian invasions (e.g. Hosea 14:4–7; Joel 3:17–18; Micah 7:18–20).	**10**

Question	Answer	Marks
7(b)	**'The Book of Amos goes too far in its prophecies of doom.' Evaluate this claim.** Answers to this might depend on how candidates interpret the salvation oracles in 9:11–15. In favour of the statement, words of unmitigated doom might be seen as pointless, since they would give those who heard him no incentive to change their ways. For example, Amos' denunciations of Amaziah/Bethel and Jeroboam were angrily rejected. Amos' response to that was even more doom-laden, culminating in the comment: 'You yourself shall die in an unclean land, and Israel shall go into exile' (7:17). Some might argue that if Amos spoke only words of doom, people would simply not have understood him. For example he railed at the rich who bribed the courts to find in their favour at the expense of the poor, or who sold the poor into slavery. Accusations such as these would have probably not have been understood by the Israelites, because Israel during the long reign of Jeroboam II was very prosperous, and wealth was seen as a sign of God's approval, so unrelieved doom oracles would have had little chance of persuading Israel to bring about social justice and a redistribution of wealth. In other words, Amos made the situation worse. Further, being from Judah, Amos delivering his prophecies in the North would have been even more inflammatory, hence Amaziah told him to get back to Judah and prophesy there (7:12). Some conclude, therefore that it is unlikely that Amos would preach unrelieved doom without offering the carrot of eventual salvation. Taking this approach, then, the salvation oracle might well be the words of Amos or of one of his disciples, so he did not in fact go too far in prophesying doom. Some argue that Amos did offer some hope, for example where he interceded with Yahweh on behalf of Israel. When Yahweh shows Amos his intention to destroy Israel by locust swarms and then by fire, Amos intercedes, Yahweh listens and withdraws both threats (7:1–6). Nevertheless, by the time we get to the end of the visions in 7–9, Yahweh has decided that the corruption is so intense that not one person shall escape the coming destruction (9:1). Amos therefore offered hope, but God decided that there could be no hope given the scale of social injustice and religious apostasy within the kingdom. In 3:8, Amos says, 'God has spoken, who can but prophesy?' Amos is referring to the belief that true prophets spoke what God commanded, and this is the hallmark of a true prophet. According to this belief, Amos had no option but to pronounce complete doom. Much the same approach is seen in Jeremiah's comments on the differences between true and false prophets. True prophets speak what they hear in Yahweh's council, and what they speak is uttered under prophetic compulsion. Jeremiah maintained that the true prophets before him prophesied war, famine and pestilence rather than words of salvation, and that would have included Amos. History confirms that Amos' pronouncements of unrelieved doom were in fact confirmed, since after 20 years of Assyrian invasion and deportations, the Kingdom of Israel ceased to exist.	**15**

Question	Answer	Marks
8	**‘Elijah had no significant influence on the development of Old Testament prophecy.’ Critically assess this claim.** Candidates might refer to some of the following points: A common assessment of the significance of Elijah in the development of OT prophecy is that although without Moses prophecy might not have begun, without Elijah, it would have died. This is said in the context of Elijah’s confrontation with Ahab and Jezebel, since the latter brought with her worship of Phoenician Baal, and Ahab made provision for this in the temple built in Samaria. Jezebel apparently killed the Yahweh prophets (1 Kings 18:13), and this brought about a major conflict between the prophets of Baal/Asherah and Elijah. The contest between them on Mount Carmel culminated in Elijah slaughtering the Baal/Asherah prophets in order to keep Yahwism alive. The effect was that Elijah demonstrated that Yahweh is the Lord of the heavens, and not Baal. The confrontation was a result of the 3-year drought (announced by Yahweh through Elijah, 1 Kings 17:1), which ends at the conclusion of the contest on Carmel: Yahweh is shown to be the bringer of rain, and not Baal. Elijah is thus credited with reviving Yahwism from the brink of extinction: a significant and lasting influence. Some might refer to the narrative in 1 Kings 19, seen by some as the call of Elijah, whereby Elijah is thought to have brought about a new development in Israelite prophecy, in that Yahweh is experienced through the ‘still, small voice’ (v.12) as opposed to the forces of wind, earthquake or fire or violent ecstasy. Some see this as the establishing of a new kind of relationship with God, who responds to Elijah’s distress at being pursued by Jezebel by a personal revelation to Elijah. Elijah is credited with reviving contact with Yahweh Some might point out that in his dealings with Ahab and Jezebel over their killing of Naboth and appropriation of Naboth’s vineyard, Elijah appeared to confront them as a prophet of social justice, a trend that was developed in the dealings of later prophets with kings, not least in Amos’ rejection of Jeroboam II. Some might argue, however, that Elijah is an archetypal rather than a real figure in the development of prophecy: his achievements display a character larger than life. This kind of prophetic portrait can be seen in connection with other great figures: for example, Moses has so many roles in the Old Testament narratives that it is difficult to see which, if any of these, really describes a ‘real’ prophet. In particular, Moses is often credited with the development of ecstatic prophecy (Numbers 11), but that narrative sounds anachronistic. There are a number of theories concerning the origin and development of Old Testament prophecy in Israel, including, for example, the thesis of F.M. Cross that prophecy began with the monarchy, in which case Samuel (as the anointer of both Saul and David) might be seen as far more important in the prophetic tradition than Elijah. Elijah is sometimes portrayed as weak and fearful, for example in his dealings with Jezebel, before whom he flees for his life, despite having managed to kill several hundred of her prophets during the contest on Mount Carmel (1 Kings 18). Archetypal/mythological themes are developed with Elijah that appear elsewhere in prophetic narratives, for example where Elijah divided the waters of the Jordan to allow a safe crossing for himself and Elisha (2 Kings 2:8).	**25**

Question	Answer	Marks
8	In other words, it is difficult to know which themes really belong to Elijah and which are typological or mythological, for example. Elijah’s influence in the development of later tradition, however, is clear. He is associated particularly with performing miracles. Aside from bringing down fire from heaven on Carmel, he also multiplies meal and oil for the widow and her son (1 Kings 17:8–16) and later restores the widow’s son to life (vv.17–24), and concludes his prophetic life by a miraculous translation to heaven (2 Kings 2). The significance of these miracles for prophecy can clearly be seen in the place of Elijah in later Judaism, where he is so important that in the New Testament narrative of Jesus’ transfiguration, where Moses represents law, it is Elijah who represents prophecy (Mark 9:2–8). Moreover Jesus multiplies food and restores life to the son of the widow of Nain in apparent emulation of two of Elijah’s miracles; and Jesus makes it clear that Elijah will be the herald of the messianic age (Mark 9:9–13) – he will usher in the fulfilment of both prophecy and law. Credit any reasonable line of argumentation.	

Question	Answer	Marks
9	**Critically examine the claim that all Israelite prophets operated within the cult.** It is sometimes claimed that true prophets did not operate within the cult, but rather that they stood outside the cult in order to criticise it. For example, Elijah dissociated himself from the Baal cult favoured by Ahab and Jezebel; moreover, prophets like Nathan and Gad appear to have been court prophets rather than prophets attached to the cult. Further, some scholars hold that true prophets would not accept remuneration for their services, because the whole point of prophecy was that the prophetic word was spoken under the compulsion of Yahweh (e.g. Amos 3:8) rather than through the desire to earn money. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that all prophets operated within the cult. As founder figures, both Moses and Samuel had cultic/priestly duties. Samuel was living in the Shiloh temple under the tutelage of Eli, the high priest. Some prophets clearly operated in the royal court, such as Nathan and Gad, but their function included cultic duties. In 2 Samuel 24 we find Gad giving David instructions on building an altar. In the David narratives, we find Nathan deeply concerned with instructions concerning the religious duty of building the Jerusalem Temple, a duty that Nathan subsequently delegated to Solomon. In the Northern Kingdom/Israel, it is clear that at least some (if not all) of the prophecies of Amos were delivered in the royal sanctuary at Bethel, from which he was ejected by the high priest Amaziah (Amos 7). Hosea was quite possibly married to a cultic prostitute, a situation which provided him with the parallelism he made between the sins of Gomer and those of Israel (Hosea 1–3); moreover some commentators accept that Hosea himself also functioned within the cult, which might explain his relationship with Gomer. In the Kingdom of Judah, Isaiah of Jerusalem experienced his vision of Yahweh, and his call to prophesy, within the Temple; and it may have been the case that he had priestly duties there. Jeremiah's father was a priest (Jer. 1:1), and his oracles are often similar in form to priestly oracles; moreover Jeremiah produced a number of 'confessions' which are arguably cultic in context, and appear to include a priest's response to a request for help or healing (e.g. 11:18–12:6). The texts refer also to prophetic bands, or guilds, known as 'sons of the prophets', who functioned under a leader at a sanctuary/temple. These figure clearly in the narratives concerning Elijah and Samuel, particularly in the narrative of the election of Saul as king. Samuel appears to have been the head of a group based at Ramah (1 Samuel 7), and from this group Saul is 'infected' with a prophetic ecstasy which forms some part of his fitness to be king. Some might argue that it is not necessary to claim either that all prophets operated within the cult or else that they all stood outside it. For example, the fact that prophets were highly critical of the cult proves nothing, since it would be possible to criticise religious practices from either perspective. Some prophets might have been tied to a specific sanctuary; others could have had a more wide-ranging role, so there may be no need to insist that all prophets either were, or were not, cultic prophets. Credit any reasonable line of argumentation.	**25**