Rewarding Learning

ADVANCED
General Certificate of Education
2018

History

Assessment Unit A2 1

[AH211]

WEDNESDAY 6 JUNE, AFTERNOON

MARK SCHEME

Level of response mark grid

This level of response grid has been developed as a general basis for marking candidates' work, according to the following assessment objectives:

AO1a   recall, select and deploy historical knowledge accurately and communicate knowledge and understanding of history in a clear and effective manner;

AO1b   present historical explanations, showing understanding of appropriate concepts and arrive at substantiated judgements;

AO2   In relation to historical context:

•   interpret, evaluate and use a range of source material;

•   explain and evaluate interpretations of historical events and topics studied.

The grid should be used in conjunction with the information on indicative content outlined for each assessment unit.

Level	Assessment Objective 1a	Assessment Objective 1b	Assessment Objective 2
	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:	Answers at this level will:
1	recall, select and deploy some accurate factual knowledge and communicate limited understanding in narrative form. There will be evidence of an attempt to structure and present answers in a coherent manner.	display a basic understanding of the topic; some comments may be relevant, but general and there may be assertions and judgements which require supporting evidence.	limited recognition of the possibility of debate surrounding an event or topic.
2	be quite accurate, contain some detail and show understanding through a mainly narrative approach. Communication may have occasional lapses of clarity and/or coherence.	display general understanding of the topic and its associated concepts and offer explanations which are mostly relevant, although there may be limited analysis and a tendency to digress. There will be some supporting evidence for assertions and judgements.	an attempt to explain different approaches to and interpretations of the event or topic. Evaluation may be limited.
3	contain appropriate examples with illustrative and supportive factual evidence and show understanding and ability to engage with the issues raised by the question in a clear and coherent manner.	display good breadth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Analysis is generally informed and suitably illustrated to support explanations and judgements.	there will be an ability to present and evaluate different arguments for and against particular interpretations of an event or topic.
4	be accurate and well-informed and show ability to engage fully with the demands of the question. Knowledge and understanding will be expressed with clarity and precision.	display breadth and depth of understanding of the topic and its associated concepts. Explanations will be well-informed with arguments and judgements well-substantiated, illustrated and informed by factual evidence.	there will be appropriate explanation, insightful interpretation and well-argued evaluation of particular interpretations of an event or topic.

Synoptic Assessment

Examiners should assess the candidate's ability to draw together knowledge and skills in order to demonstrate overall historical understanding. Candidates' answers should demonstrate breadth of historical knowledge and understanding by ranging comprehensively across the period of study as a whole. They should make links and comparisons which are properly developed and analysed and thus indicate understanding of the process of historical change. The knowledge and understanding of the subject should come from more than one perspective – political or cultural or economic – and there should be understanding demonstrated of the connections or inter-relationship between these perspectives.

Generic Levels of Response for Synoptic Assessment

The generic levels of response should be used in conjunction with the information on the indicative content outlined for each answer.

Level 1 ([0]–[5]) AO2(b), ([0]–[7]) AO1(b)
Answers at this level may recall some accurate knowledge and display understanding of mainly one part of the period and one perspective. The answer will be characterised throughout by limited accuracy and a lack of clarity. Answers may provide a descriptive narrative of events. There will be few links and comparisons made between different parts of the period. Answers will be mainly a series of unsubstantiated assertions with little analysis **AO1(b)**. There may be perhaps an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations but the answer may focus only on one interpretation **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised throughout by unclear meaning due to illegibility, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; there will be an inappropriate style of writing; and defects in organisation and lack of a specialist vocabulary.

Level 2 ([6]–[10]) AO2(b), ([8]–[15]) AO1(b)
Answers at this level may recall and deploy knowledge which draws from examples across the period. The answer will have frequent lapses in accuracy and at times lack clarity. The answer will provide some explanation though at times will lapse into narrative. Links and comparisons will be made but these will not be fully developed or analysed. Answers will contain some unsubstantiated assertions but also arguments which are appropriately developed and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There will be an awareness of contemporary **or** later interpretations about the subject but this will be limited and in need of further development **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will have frequent lapses in meaning, inaccurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; at times the style of writing will be inappropriate; there will be occasional defects in organisation and little specialist vocabulary.

Level 3 ([11]–[15]) AO2(b), ([16]–[22]) AO1(b)
Answers at this level will recall and deploy knowledge accurately, drawing from all parts of the period with clarity and focus. Answers provide focused explanations and make links and comparisons which are developed and analysed, indicating an understanding of the process of historical change. Arguments are developed, substantiated, illustrated and reach a judgement **AO1(b)**. There is a satisfactory evaluation of either contemporary **or** later interpretations of the subject **or** a partial evaluation of both **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be characterised by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is appropriate; there is good organisation and with some specialist vocabulary.

Level 4 ([16]–[20]) AO2(b), ([23]–[30]) AO1(b)
Answers at this level will demonstrate accurate recall of knowledge from across the period studied with clarity and precision. Answers will provide detailed and focused insightful explanations drawing on actions, events, issues or perspectives across the period, and there is an excellent understanding of the connections or interrelationships between these. A judgement is reached using arguments that are fully developed, illustrated and substantiated **AO1(b)**. There is a well informed and insightful evaluation of contemporary **and** later interpretations **AO2(b)**. Answers at this level will be consistently characterised throughout by clarity of meaning due to legibility, accurate spelling, punctuation and grammar; the style of writing is most appropriate; there is very good organisation and appropriate use of specialist vocabulary.

Option 1: Anglo-Spanish Relations 1509–1609

Answer **one** question.

1 "England was responsible for the destruction of the Anglo-Spanish alliance in the period 1509–1609." To what extent would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the impact that both England and Spain had on the alliance between them. Answers should consider the nature of this alliance as a starting point and the interaction of various monarchs across the period. Responses should consider the impact of international affairs on this alliance and the extent to which either England or Spain was in total control of its actions.

Top level answers will reflect on the different political environments that each monarch worked in across the time period and consider the level of control that they had over the alliance. Some comparison of the power of each nation is needed to reach a conclusion as to which was to blame for the breakdown in the alliance. Answers may consider the rate of decline in the alliance and whether this decline was constant or if there were periods of recovery.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of the evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) Henry VIII and Ferdinand 1509–1516
This is an important period which defined relations between the two nations. The Treaty of Medina del Campo of 1492 had re-established close ties between the two nations which were cemented by the royal marriage of Henry VIII to Catherine of Aragon in 1509. Responses should show that it was in the best interests of both nations to work together to balance the power of France. Answers should show that Anglo-Spanish relations were very strong at the beginning of the period and that both England and Spain sought to maintain this alliance.

The death of Henry VII in 1509 left an imbalance in the relationship between the two nations which could have damaged the alliance. Ferdinand was a hugely experienced monarch who attempted to manipulate his young inexperienced son-in-law to allow Spain to gain the kingdom of Navarre. Responses might refer to his correspondence with Catherine of Aragon as evidence of this manipulation. Ferdinand's aims were made easier by Henry VIII's view of himself as a 'warrior prince', rushing to war with France. Answers may show that it was the Spanish who damaged the alliance in this period but that good relations were maintained.

(b) Henry VIII and Charles V 1516–1547
Answers should show that relations between the two nations were re-defined in this period. Although Henry VIII was Charles V's uncle, he was a much less powerful ruler. Charles ruled Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and a growing New World empire, so England had far less international standing than Spain. Responses could focus on the international position

with the development of the Habsburg-Valois dynastic wars. Charles V's need of allies against France placed England in an advantageous position and Henry VIII used this to his own benefit. Answers might explain the negotiations, mentioning the Treaty of London in 1518, the Field of the Cloth of Gold in 1520 and the Treaty of Bruges of 1521. Responses might refer to Scarsbrick's view that Wolsey and England were at the very centre of European diplomacy. Henry VIII's entry into war with France in 1522 could be used to highlight how the alliance with Spain was strong but England was only a second partner in this alliance. This might be supported with Charles' comments after the Battle of Pavia when he said that Henry was not his true friend. Answers should consider who was at fault in the divorce issue.

Henry VIII's divorce of Charles V's aunt, Catherine of Aragon, damaged Habsburg prestige and this might be regarded as the beginning of the destruction of the alliance. Charles V's opposition to Henry could be portrayed as unreasonable and the source of declining Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers should show that the alliance between England and Spain was in tatters in the mid-1530s and might suggest that the break from Rome was the critical factor in undermining it. Candidates could use contemporary comments from both Charles V and Henry VIII to emphasise how both sought improved relations in the late 1530s which became reality with an alliance against France in 1542.

(c) Edward VI, Mary I and Charles V 1547–1558
Answers should show the strength of relations in this period. Edward VI's Protestant faith could have been an impediment to good relations, yet Charles V's attitude to Anglo-Spanish relations was by necessity positive. Faced with the continuation of the long Habsburg-Valois dynastic war, Charles was desperate to maintain an alliance with England against France and its ally Scotland. Candidates might use the contemporary description of Charles V as 'the sword of Catholicism' to highlight the importance of a Catholic-Protestant alliance. Faced with conflict with the Scots, we see Protector Somerset limiting his religious reforms to maintain good relations. Clearly both England and Spain were attempting to maintain their mutual alliance.

This is further highlighted during Mary's reign, when Charles V accepted humiliating marriage terms for his son Philip's marriage to the English Queen. Candidates might consider the historical debate on the strength of Mary I's government, using Elton's or Pollard's arguments to show the damage inflicted on future Anglo-Spanish relations by Philip's arrogance towards the English court during his time there. Responses might suggest that it was Philip II's manipulation of England, in war with the French, which led to a deterioration in Anglo-Spanish relations. The loss of Calais was blamed on Mary I and her Spanish husband.

(d) Elizabeth I and Philip II 1558–1598
Answers should show that this was the period of rapid decline in the Anglo-Spanish alliance, yet this decline was neither consistent nor irreversible. Philip II's marriage proposal to Elizabeth in 1559 shows that relations were still strong and the alliance was working well but Elizabeth's rejection of the proposal may have damaged future relations. Answers may point to Philip's protection of Elizabeth from Papal recriminations as evidence of their continued alliance. Responses should show that relations declined between

1568 and 1585 and might use some of the following events to illustrate that both England and Spain were at fault: Elizabeth's seizure of the silver ships, San Juan del Ulua, Spanish support for Catholic rebellions in Ireland and England and for Mary Stuart, English support for Dutch rebels, the expulsion of the Sea Beggars and clashes in the New World. Answers will consider the collapse of the alliance with the outbreak of war in 1585 and might debate the impact of the Treaty of Joinville in 1584 and the Treaty of Nonsuch in 1585. Responses might identify a change in English attitudes as a cause of the destruction of the alliance. In the early part of the period England was a second rate nation compared to Spain but by the 1580s growing English power threatened the Spanish and created an attitude among the English which led to conflict. Candidates might use anti-Spanish comments by Walsingham, Drake or Robert Dudley to support this argument. Answers could show that both Elizabeth and Philip II were responsible for the continuation of conflict for 18 years and therefore each was responsible for the destruction of the Anglo-Spanish alliance.

(e) James I and Philip III 1603–1609
Responses should show that relations improved with the signing of the Treaty of London in 1604. Both nations sought an improvement in relations due to the economic and political cost of the war. The contemporary opinions of Lerma or Robert Cecil could be used by candidates to support this. Answers should discuss which nation was most responsible for improved relations and could use historians like Starkey and Roper to highlight this. Answers could show that, although the alliance was not restored, at least peaceful co-existence was in place.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.　　　[50]

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2 "Marriage and failed marriage proposals had a greater impact on Anglo-Spanish relations than any other issue in the period 1509–1609." How far would you accept this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of the impact of marriage and failed marriage proposals, as well as a range of other issues, on Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers should attempt to show the impact of marriage and failed marriage proposals and compare it to issues such as: the impact of trade and economic considerations, political requirements, including the demands of war, and growing religious differences. Responses should consider the varying impact of these factors across the period.

Top level answers could consider how different factors were interlinked. Answers may consider that marriage and proposed marriages had the ability to affect policy rather than just confirm agreements based on economic, political and religious needs. Candidates should be able to identify a change in Anglo-Spanish relations after 1558 and could link this to a failed marriage proposal.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of the evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) Marriage and failed marriage proposals
Answers could consider some marriages which might include:
- Arthur's marriage to Catherine of Aragon, as part of the Treaty of Medina Del Campo, and the resulting difficulties in Anglo-Spanish relations.
- The marriage of Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon in 1509. Answers might show the importance of this marriage in cementing the alliance between England and Spain in 1512 and could use the correspondence between Ferdinand and his daughter as a way to support this argument. Responses could use the divorce issue of the late 1520s to show the negative impact of marriage. Charles V's comments on the slur to the Habsburg name would be a strong supporting argument.
- Mary Tudor's proposed marriage to Charles V and various Valois princes might be used to show the importance of marriage in maintaining Anglo-Spanish relations.
- Henry VIII's marriage to Anne Boleyn could be used to show its negative impact on Anglo-Spanish relations, while her comments on a French alliance might be used to support this argument.
- Answers might use Henry VIII's marriage to Anne of Cleves to show a move in English policy in favour of Protestantism and to show Charles V's annoyance at the creation of links with Princes under his rule.
- Responses could consider the impact of the marriage of Henry VIII to Catherine Parr. Catherine's religious influence on both Edward VI and Elizabeth was to have a long-lasting impact on Anglo-Spanish relations.
- Edward VI's proposed marriage to Mary Stuart raised issues with the French and drove England and Spain closer together. Somerset's comments on the need to maintain Anglo-Spanish relations could be used to support this.

- Answers might use the marriage of Mary Tudor to Philip II to show the importance of marriage but could contrast the high demands of the English Parliament to highlight political considerations.
- The marriage of Mary Stuart to Francis Valois put pressure on Elizabeth and forced her towards a pro-Spanish policy.
- Responses could consider Elizabeth's rejection of Philip II's marriage proposal in 1559 as a huge turning point in Anglo-Spanish relations. Although Philip described himself as a man released from a death sentence, Elizabeth's refusal was followed by a deterioration in relations. Answers might conclude that war between the nations came from this rejection but may decide that the 26 year gap in events points to a different cause.
- Elizabeth's proposed marriage to the Dukes of Anjou and Alencon might suggest a breakdown in Anglo-Spanish relations.

(b) Economic issues

Strong economic ties had been established between England and Spain by the Treaty of Medina del Campo of 1489 and these grew with mutual successes in trade, especially in the Netherlands. Trade embargoes were used by both nations in the early 1530s and these worsened Anglo-Spanish relations, highlighting the importance of economic issues. The changing nature of the economies of each nation placed new strains on Anglo-Spanish relations. Factors that had made the countries natural trading partners began to change. The decline in the wool trade and damage to the Antwerp money market could be used as examples of how economic issues had a greater impact than marriage on Anglo-Spanish relations.

The growing weakness of the Spanish economy due to poor agriculture, a parasitic nobility and Church, and investment directed towards government bonds was intensified by Philip II's spending, particularly on war. Dependence on New World bullion, due to internal Spanish economic weakness, led to a greater clash with England as it developed its American interests. Clashes at San Juan del Ulua show the impact of economic issues, in particular in the New World, on Anglo-Spanish relations.

England's search for diversity in international trade to balance difficulties in Dutch trade caused major clashes in the Americas. England was not prepared to follow Papal direction and let Spain dominate the New World. Difficulties in the Netherlands led to English interference to protect its trade in this area, showing how economic issues influenced Anglo-Spanish relations. The signing of the Treaty of Nonsuch between England and the Netherlands in 1585 could be linked to economic issues which directly led to war.

(c) Religious issues

Henry VIII's divorce from Catherine of Aragon initiated the English Reformation. This was resisted by Charles V, for dynastic reasons, adding religious issues to existing differences. Answers might debate whether religion or marriage had the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. Edward VI's move toward strong Protestantism deepened divisions and might suggest that religion had the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations. Answers might suggest that good relations remained despite religious differences and hence support the view that religion was not a key factor in Anglo-Spanish relations. A return to Catholicism under Mary I was

linked to dynastic union between Mary and Philip. Religious persecution under Mary I became associated with Spanish influence on politics and tainted future relations. Philip II saw himself as 'the sword' of the Catholic Reformation, while England saw itself as an "Elect nation". Both countries believed that they had a divine mission to further God's will and work. Answers could use this to show that, as religious differences grew, Anglo-Spanish relations declined and so this factor arguably had a greater impact on Anglo-Spanish relations than marriage and failed marriage proposals. After initially limiting Papal action against Elizabeth, Philip supported her excommunication. After the English Reformation, and especially in Elizabeth's reign, Englishmen were no longer prepared to accept the papal division of the non-European world. Their privateering was justified as a response to an injustice, while Philip saw the privateers as heretics and their activities added insult to injury. He also had a sense of mission to 'catholicise' the New World. England, a Protestant country, sympathised with the Protestant rebels of the northern Netherlands, while Spain, a Catholic country, saw the rebellions as a religious revolt and therefore saw English interference as religiously motivated. Events in France also had religious dimensions. As the Dutch revolt matured, Calvinism became identified with resistance. Philip I feared that a France controlled by the Calvinist Huguenots would be anti-Spanish and would intervene in the Netherlands to support their co-religionists. Similarly, Elizabeth I was concerned that France led by the Catholic Guise would support Spain and allow Philip to complete the re-conquest of the Netherlands. Spanish interference in English internal policies was linked to support for Catholicism and the Catholic champion for the English throne, Mary of Scots. Responses could argue that the growth of religious differences in the later part of the period had the single most important impact on Anglo-Spanish relations.

(d) Political influences
Answers should show that politics or dynastic need was always essential and that, in most cases, marriage was merely a means of cementing these links. The Treaty of Medina del Campo sought an alliance between Spain and England to balance the power of France. Marriage supported this aim and was used by Ferdinand to draw the inexperienced Henry VIII into war against France in 1512. Henry's dislike of the French again allied him to Spain in 1522 but political discord, after the Battle of Pavia in 1525, showed the first signs of the break-up of the Anglo-Spanish alliance. Responses should consider the divorce issue and use it to show Henry VIII's desire for a male heir to further his dynastic needs. In contrast, the opposition of Charles V suggests that he was driven to support his aunt, rather than maintain Henry as a political ally against the French. Responses should show that, despite the divorce issue, the Anglo-Spanish alliance was resumed in 1542, proving that the dynastic need to counter France had the greatest impact on relations. Answers could show the same dynastic need in Somerset's continuing of this alliance in 1547 or in Charles V's acceptance of harsh marriage terms in 1554.

Answers might show that Anglo-Spanish relations in the second part of the period were driven more by the personal feelings of Elizabeth and Philip II than by political or religious necessity. Mervyn's comment that "they looked for ways to annoy each other" emphasises this. Responses could consider the Treaties of Joinville and Nonsuch and show how political aims and

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the misunderstanding of them by respective monarchs led directly to war. Answers could use a range of events to demonstrate the tit for tat nature of Anglo-Spanish relations in the 1570s and 80s. The establishment of peace at the Treaty of London in 1604 demonstrates that it could only be achieved after both Elizabeth and Philip II had left the scene. The Duke of Lerma's desire for peace was driven by Spain's need to deal with the Dutch issue, clearly showing that political necessity had the greatest impact on Anglo-Spanish relations.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

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Option 1 | **50**

Option 2: Crown and Parliament in England 1603–1702

Answer **one** question.

1 "Of all the monarchs in the period 1603–1702, James II did most damage to the relationship between Crown and Parliament in England." How far would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the reign of James II and the extent to which he damaged the relationship between King and Parliament. A comparative analysis should be made with the reigns of James I, Charles I, Charles II and William and Mary.

Top level responses will reflect on the breakdown in the relationship between James II and his Parliament that resulted in the Glorious Revolution. James II's actions and attitudes were perceived by many contemporaries to be pro-Catholic and pro-absolutist.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) James II 1685–1688/9
Despite inheriting a strong political and financial position, James II quickly alienated Parliament by maintaining a standing army. Before the end of the first year of his reign, his relationship with Parliament had broken down and his subsequent actions led to the Glorious Revolution and the creation of a new settlement between King and Parliament. During his reign, James II was believed to have been promoting both Catholicism and absolutism. His removal in the Glorious Revolution represented a significant challenge to the concept of the divine right of kings and the relationship between Crown and Parliament had been altered forever. Contemporary opinion of leading figures such as Bishop Compton may be included to explain the impact of the policies of James II.

(b) James I 1603–1625
At the outset of his reign, James I held the dominant position in the relationship, although he was dependent on parliamentary supply. Despite some clashes with his parliaments over finance, religion and foreign policy, the reign of James I was characterised by co-operation rather than conflict. The Addled Parliament and the later clashes over monopolies provided evidence of the differences between the King and his Parliaments. Even though there were certainly moments of tension in the relationship and at times a temporary breakdown, there were no significant long-term changes. The opinion of an historian such as Anderson may be employed.

(c) Charles I 1625–1649
By 1629, Charles I's foreign policy failures and fund-raising methods contributed to Parliament issuing the Petition of Right and ultimately the King deciding to close down Parliament. During his Personal Rule, the King's abuse of his prerogative financial devices, changes to the Church and the

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closed nature of his court all contributed to perceptions of Catholicism and absolutism which damaged his relationship with the ruling classes.

The Constitutional Revolution represented a major change in the relationship between the two, as Parliament was able to restrict the King's prerogative powers and increase the scope and regularity of its role in government. Despite these changes, many of the major parliamentary reforms never made the statute books and the Crown retained most of its major prerogative powers. Candidates may use the contemporary opinion of MPs such as John Pym.

Arguably, the ultimate breakdown in the relationship between Crown and Parliament came on the battlefields of the Civil War. The execution of Charles I could be seen to represent the ultimate victory of Parliament. However, only a minority of MPs agreed to put Charles on trial and ultimately the army played the dominant role in his death. Furthermore, the restoration of his son suggests that the breakdown in the relationship between Crown and Parliament was only temporary. The Marxist interpretation by historians such as Hill may be employed to enhance the debate.

(d) **Charles II 1660–1685**
Although the reforms of the Constitutional Revolution remained in place, the Restoration represented a remarkable comeback by the monarchy. Initially, Charles II enjoyed a good relationship with his Cavalier Parliament, which passed a number of acts to strengthen the Crown's position. Despite Parliament's attempts to restrict the King's financial independence, the trade expansion enlarged the Crown's purse. The power of Charles II's position is evidenced by his survival of the Exclusion Crisis unscathed. However, the same incident revealed the extent of the damage to his relationship with Parliament. The personal rule that concluded his reign suggests that there were significant strains in the relationship. Although Charles left a strong throne to his brother, his Declarations of Indulgence and links with France had aroused fears of Catholicism and absolutism that were to prove critical in the reign of James II. The contemporary opinion of the Earl of Shaftesbury may be included.

(e) **William and Mary 1689–1702**
The revised Coronation Oath and Bill of Rights signalled a new relationship between Crown and Parliament. The Crown's dispensing power and abuse of legal proceedings were ended and taxes were not to be levied nor a standing army called without parliamentary consent. Despite these changes, it could be argued that the relationship had not been revolutionised and the monarchy's position remained dominant. Indeed, the new monarchs had agreed to the terms of their coronation and it was William who had insisted on a joint monarchy.

The most significant change in the relationship between Crown and Parliament came as a result of the 'King's War' in Europe. A revised Triennial Act and the establishment of the Commission of Accounts, Civil List and Bank of England helped to make Parliament an essential and permanent institution of government. The reign of William and Mary saw the creation of a partnership between Crown and Parliament. However, arguably a similar working relationship had existed between James I and his parliament

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at the outset of the century. Furthermore, the Crown retained many of its most important prerogative powers, including the right to choose ministers, determine foreign policy and call, dissolve and prorogue Parliament. Comments from historians such as Williams may be included to explain the changing nature of the monarch's relationship with his Parliament.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.   [50]

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2 "By 1702 Parliament was in a more powerful position than the monarchy."
To what extent would you accept this assessment of the changing relations
between Crown and Parliament in England in the period 1603–1702?

This question requires an assessment of how the relationship between Crown
and Parliament changed throughout the course of the seventeenth century. Top
level responses will reflect on how and when the relationship changed and the
extent to which Parliament had secured a position of dominance by the end of the
period. The Constitutional Revolution, the execution of Charles I, the Restoration
Settlement, the Glorious Revolution and particularly the reign of William and Mary
saw the power and position of Parliament fluctuate.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological,
adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the
requirement for creditable marks.

**Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary
and later interpretations:**

(a) The relationship between Crown and Parliament in 1603
   In 1603, Parliament maintained contact between the monarch and his
   subjects and was responsible for providing the King with advice and supply,
   as well as passing bills. The Crown held the power to; summon, prorogue
   and dissolve Parliament; obstruct legislation; dispense individuals from or
   suspend law; issue proclamations and vary customs duties. Parliament was
   not permitted to debate foreign policy or have control over the armed forces.
   As an irregular event, Parliament had limited status and influence in early
   Stuart England. It was also weakened by the factional nature of politics.
   Parliament's main strength was in its power to help change the law and
   its influence over the financial position of the monarchy. While the reign of
   James I saw some significant clashes between King and Parliament, notably
   over monopolies and foreign policy, there was little significant change to their
   relationship and the monarchy retained the dominant position. Candidates
   may include an observation by an historian such as Russell about the nature
   of the relationship between Crown and Parliament at the end of James I's
   reign.

(b) The 'Constitutional Revolution' of 1640–1642
   During this period, Parliament was able to impose limits on royal power.
   The Triennial Act and the Act Against Own Dissolution prevented a return to
   personal rule and the abolition of the Crown's prerogative financial devices
   made the King more reliant upon Parliament. The abolition of the prerogative
   courts restricted the King's independence in the legal system. However,
   Parliament did not secure dominance over the Crown. It failed to secure
   the right to choose the monarch's ministers and lessen his control of the
   Anglican Church. Despite losing a number of feudal dues, the King retained
   the right to collect customs duties and the control of the armed forces also
   remained a royal prerogative. Despite these limitations, the Constitutional
   Revolution had transformed the relationship between Crown and Parliament.
   The Whig interpretation of the Constitutional Revolution could be used to
   analyse the extent to which the role of Parliament changed.

(c) The execution of Charles I 1649
   The execution of Charles I represents the ultimate breakdown in the
   relationship between Crown and Parliament. During the Interregnum, the

monarch was in exile and Parliament appeared to be in the dominant position. However, Charles I's execution was not supported by all MPs and it could be argued that it was the army that held the position of political dominance during this period. Furthermore, the collapse of the interregnum and the restoration of Charles II suggest that the improved position of Parliament was only temporary. Candidates may include a comment from an historian such as Kenyon about the significance of the execution.

(d) **The Restoration Settlement and the reign of Charles II 1660–1685**
Even though some historians have argued that the Restoration should be seen as the monarchy returning on Parliament's terms, the position and power of Charles II was initially strong and was strengthened further by the events of his reign. Although the Restoration Settlement confirmed all the reforms of the Constitutional Revolution, the Clarendon Code and Test Acts reasserted the supremacy of Parliament over the Church and the Cavalier Parliament further strengthened the position of the monarchy by making it treason to imprison or restrain the King, censoring the press and passing a weakened Triennial Act. The views of historians such as Coward and McInnes could be used to explain the strengthening of the position of the monarchy in this period. The strength of the Crown is evidenced by Charles II's ability to survive the Exclusion Crisis and secure a strong financial position which enabled him to implement personal rule in the final few years of his reign. Good responses may note that during the Exclusion Crisis political parties emerged, enabling a new form of politics to develop with an emphasis on policy rather than local or family interests. Arguably, this was to transform the nature of Parliament and strengthen its capacity to challenge the power and position of the monarch.

(e) **The Glorious Revolution and the Revolution Settlement 1688–1689**
Although James II inherited a strong position from his brother, including a loyal Tory Parliament, his position was quickly undermined by his pro-Catholic, and seemingly pro-absolutist, policies. James dissolved his parliament within a year and refused to call it throughout the rest of his short and controversial reign. The actions and attitude of James contributed directly to the events of the Glorious Revolution and the new style of monarchy which emerged. The joint monarchy of William and Mary was restricted by the new Coronation Oath, the Bill of Rights, the Mutiny Act, the Toleration Act and the revised financial arrangements. However, although Parliament had secured a significant position of influence on the government, it was still not in a more powerful position than the monarchy.

(f) **Changes to the role and status of Parliament during the reign of William III**
To fund his European conflict William was willing to allow Parliament an increased role in government. Parliament became more powerful in the realm of finance, achieving royal dependence and accountability through the Commission of Accounts and Civil List. The Act of Settlement created an independent judiciary and determined the religion of the monarch and the succession. The new Triennial Act established the duration of a Parliament as three years. This new style of government gave Parliament a permanency that allowed it to become more efficient and effective in its operation. Political parties became more organised and influential, further increasing the strength of Parliament's position. By 1700, the Crown appointed ministers who could command a majority in the House of Commons. Parliament also clarified its role in foreign affairs and the Act of Settlement of 1701 dictated

that the Crown could not go to war without its support. The revisionist interpretation of the reign of William and Mary may be used to explain the changing role and status of Parliament in this period.

However, monarchy remained central to the rule of England and Parliament did not dominate government. Good responses may even argue that the relationship had always been co-dependent and the financial and military strength of the monarchy in 1702 suggests that it remained powerful.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

	AVAILABLE MARKS
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Option 2	**50**

Option 3: Liberalism and Nationalism in Europe 1815–1914

Answer **one** question.

1   "1848 represented the most important turning point in the fortunes of liberalism in Europe in the period 1815–1914." How far would you agree with this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of the progress made by liberalism before and after 1848, with emphasis on the contrast between the periods 1815–1848 and 1849–1914. The events of 1848, as well as their implications for the ensuing development of liberalism in Europe, should feature in the response. Both economic and political dimensions should receive attention.

Top level responses will note the fortunes of liberalism across the entire period, noting examples of progress and regression, analysing and evaluating the response of both liberals and governments to the events of the 1848 revolutions and reaching a clearly argued conclusion, with supporting evidence from a variety of contemporary and later historical sources.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of the evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a)   Before 1848 liberalism's fortunes will usually be seen to have ebbed rather than flowed, the 1815 Treaty of Vienna restoring pre-revolutionary régimes across Europe in 1815, régimes which, in many cases, worked assiduously to eradicate any remaining revolutionary or liberal influence. Metternich was prominent both in shaping the Vienna settlement and in deploying the Holy Alliance and the Congress System to curb liberalism. In Italy, Austrian troops quelled outbreaks of part liberal, part nationalist revolution in Piedmont and Naples in 1820, and in the duchies in 1831. In Germany, the Carlsbad Decrees (1819) and the Six Articles (1832), curbing intellectual freedom in the wake of liberal demonstrations, were passed by a Diet strongly influenced by Metternich. In his own Austria, surveillance and censorship were extensively, if rather ineffectively, used to limit liberal progress, while with Metternich's prompting a French expedition restored the Spanish authoritarian Ferdinand VII in 1823. Metternich's trenchant views on the dangers of liberalism might be quoted as contemporary interpretation. In France, Charles X lost his throne apparently trying to undo the comparatively liberal Charter of 1814. As well as opposition from the conservative powers, liberalism's fortunes were hindered by the narrowness of its appeal, the ideology predominantly taken up by students and intellectuals, as well as some of the middle classes. Its leaders were politically inexperienced, often naïve, and found little support among the workers, still less from the peasantry. Jacques Droz usefully interprets the liberals' difficulties as they faced hostility from both conservatism and movements more attuned to the desires of the workers.

(b)   Yet for all Metternich's negative influence on liberal fortunes, the Austrian Foreign Minister, later Chancellor, was not always able to prevent liberal gains, however tenuous they were, and better responses will point this out. For example, in Germany, the states of the south west, those nearest

France, maintained constitutions between 1815 and 1848, while in the early 1830s both Hanover and Brunswick made liberal gains. Despite its basic illiberalism, Prussia led the way in economic liberalism, with its founding of the Prussian Customs Union, later to become the free trading area of the *Zollverein* (1834). The French Charter made it the most liberal state on mainland Europe. While he was on the throne, Louis XVIII did all he could to preserve the Charter, and, after 1830, Louis Philippe initially looked as if he would give liberalism fresh impetus. Alfred Cobban's assessment of how these hopes turned sour might be used as an historian's interpretation.

(c) The events of 1848 were a low point in the fortunes of liberalism, but they highlighted its weaknesses, while paradoxically giving it fresh impetus. Responses should note that liberals learnt from their mistakes, and that rulers were sufficiently alarmed by their experiences to realise that compromise was, in the long term, conducive to their survival. Liberal revolutions failed in 1848 because of lack of experience and indecision on the part of their leaders, who failed to consolidate their initial successes. In Germany, while the Frankfurt Parliament debated the finer points of a constitution, the conservative forces regrouped prior to retaking control. M.S. Anderson's interpretation stresses the importance of social division in the failure of the liberals. In France the provisional government brought on a dangerously revolutionary situation with its mishandling of the National Workshops issue. A further reason for failure was related to this phenomenon, replicated in Vienna, where essentially bourgeois liberals were frightened by the radical mob they believed they had released, and were correspondingly more inclined to accept the return of the old régimes. Finally, the temporarily deposed powers retained the support of their armies, against which the liberals were helpless. But what they had achieved was the overthrow of their arch-enemy Metternich and the abolition of serfdom in the Habsburg Empire, while they had sown the seed of future progress by giving the old leaders pause for thought. Fredrick William IV's conciliatory address to the people of Berlin in March 1848 is an illustration of this.

(d) The lessons learned from 1848 did not mean an immediate surge in the fortunes of liberalism. The Bach system in 1850s Austria represented a return to authoritarian government. In Prussia, Frederick William IV's constitution, surprisingly granted after the last vestiges of the 1848 revolutions had died down, was crucially altered by the introduction of an illiberal three-tier voting system, while in France the Second Republic fell to Napoleon III's coup of 1851, and a period of authoritarian rule followed. In Napoleon III's preamble to the 1852 constitution he describes himself as "responsible" (to the nation) and insists he has to rule "freely…and without hindrance". Better answers may note, however, that even under the Empire universal male suffrage was retained, not quite what liberals desired, but an important concession nonetheless. In addition, the Piedmontese *Statuto*, which survived the upheavals of 1848, was the base on which Cavour built Piedmont up to be a prosperous, influential liberal state: an example to Italy and to other European countries. It was the following decade when continued liberal campaigning and realistic rulers combined to see a surge in the fortunes of liberalism. Napoleon III, perhaps responding to pressure, perhaps because he had always promised "liberty later", introduced a series of reforms heralding the "liberal Empire". In Prussia, the liberals rose to become the largest parliamentary party, vigorously opposing the von Roon army reforms, especially the abolition of the middle class *Landwehr*. In Austria, the February Patent of 1861 and the *Ausgleich* of 1867 marked

moves towards constitutionalism, including the steady increase of suffrage, by now a Europe-wide phenomenon. The French Third Republic, formed in 1870, showed that liberals had learned one of the harsh lessons of their defeat in 1848, and were prepared to take tough, even ruthless steps to defend the republic, employing overwhelming military force to defeat the Commune, later showing political steel to prevent a royalist coup. In Prussia the breakaway National Liberals swung behind their former enemy Bismarck, going on to back his anti-Catholic campaign in the early days of the Second Reich. James J. Sheehan might be utilised to illustrate interpretation of their *Realpolitik*. In economics, free trade became almost *de rigeur* in the middle years of the century, even in France, where the wisdom of tariff reduction was dubious.

(e) The rise in the fortunes of liberalism faltered towards the end of the century. The Kingdom of Italy, the achievement of which had been a success story for hard-headed liberalism, was no shop window for the ideology, as the policy known as *trasformismo* led to authoritarianism and corruption. In Austria, the liberals became increasingly conservative, fragmenting into a series of warring groups in 1873, while by the turn of the century Franz Josef was turning back to authoritarianism. Although the German Reichstag was elected by universal male suffrage, its powers were strictly limited, while William II, after he became Emperor in 1888, sought to increase his "personal rule". His comment that "democratic principles can create weak pillars of society" is a useful contemporary interpretation, while J C G Röhl is an historian whose interpretation of the increasing power of the military in Wilhelmine Germany might also be referenced. Although the Third Republic should be credited for having seen off threats from the right (Boulanger, the Dreyfus Affair) and the left (the syndicalist strikes of 1906–1909), the very fact of these existential threats to the Republic might suggest that liberal values had put down only shallow roots. The liberals were essentially middle class, and wanted to retain power for themselves, a trend going back to Guizot in the reign of Louis Philippe. An age of increasing electorates was sometimes harmful to the fortunes of the liberals, as radicals and even socialists had to be accommodated. Already there had, from 1879, been a widespread retreat from free trade, and another pillar of economic liberalism fell when Germany, followed by Austria and others, introduced state insurance schemes, which stressed collectivism rather than the individualistic philosophy of liberalism. It had always been a struggle to win over significant numbers of the newly enfranchised members of the working classes to liberal values, but the appeal of well-organised socialist parties made this task even more difficult. In Germany, for instance, the Social Democratic Party was, in the early years of the twentieth century, the largest party in the Reichstag, and the natural preponderance of the lower classes in any population profile made the future fortunes of a classical liberal party questionable.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately　　　　　[50]

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2 "Physical force was the only means by which nationalist success was achieved in Europe between 1815 and 1914." To what extent would you accept this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the various successes achieved by nationalism during this period, particularly the creation of new nation-states such as Germany, Italy and Belgium. The means by which this process was achieved will be described, whether it was as a result of revolution, war, politics, culture or a combination of these or indeed other factors.

Top level answers may note and compare the failure of one attempted means, but the later success of another. "Success" may be interpreted in different ways, such as cultural nationalism, or, from a government's point of view, the adoption of state-sponsored nationalism to increase the loyalty of the people. There will be a clearly argued conclusion, with supporting evidence from a variety of contemporary and later historical sources.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) There was little nationalist success between 1815 and 1848. Indeed, the Vienna Treaty of 1815 deliberately set out to destroy the Napoleonic systems in Germany and Italy, which had reduced the number of small states, rationalising them into larger units which pointed the way towards unification. This may be noted, as well as the largely fruitless attempts of nationalists to pursue their cause during the early years of the period. Mark Jarrett is an historian who interprets the period in terms of the influence of the Holy Alliance. Risings in Italy in 1820 and 1831, which had nationalist as well as liberal facets, were crushed by Austrian troops. It was in Habsburg interests to preserve their territories by acting decisively to prevent the spread of nationalist ideas, and this was again shown when the German Confederation was coerced into restricting academic freedom after student demonstrations at Wartburg and Hambach. Metternich's explanation of this need to oppose nationalism at all costs would be useful here, referring, for example, to his "Political Confession of Faith". A Polish rising against Russian rule was ruthlessly suppressed in 1830. In Italy, recognising the failure of the secret societies to achieve any form of nationalist success, Giuseppe Mazzini founded Young Italy in 1831. It wanted a republican, democratic, unitary Italy, to be won by revolution, but in a series of failed revolts across the decade it proved no more successful than its predecessors. 1848 saw nationalist hopes briefly raised, then dashed again. In Italy Charles Albert of Piedmont took up the cudgels against the Austrians, but lost. In the Habsburg Empire itself Magyar and Croat risings both eventually failed, while the Frankfurt Parliament debated earnestly but failed to take decisive action to unite Germany, Austrian troops carrying out the *coup de grâce* in dispersing the last remnants of the parliament. With the exception of the Frankfurt Parliament, these nationalist convulsions all involved the use of physical force, but the forces that could be mustered were small by comparison with the armies of the old empires. Between 1815 and 1848 physical force had indeed been crucial, but unless nationalists could offer much greater force than their enemies they could not hope for success.

(b) Yet although nationalism had, to date, failed in central Europe, on its edges there were two key successes. In Belgium, frustration over economic and religious grievances led the southern provinces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to revolt against Dutch control. Rioting and great power agreement that the Belgians ought to be free were sufficient to bring about the nationalist success of an independent Belgium, and, although Holland launched a briefly successful invasion of Belgium in 1831, French military threats compelled its withdrawal. Better answers might note that for Belgian success the threat of force, not from nationalists but from the Powers, was the key factor. Greece was the other major nationalist success before 1848. The revolt of the Greeks against their Turkish overlords began in 1821 and lasted, with periods of prolonged negotiations, until Greek independence was declared in 1832. By 1826 it had appeared that the revolt was over, defeated, but an Allied expeditionary force became involved, and, at Navarino Bay, the combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet was destroyed, changing the entire course of the rebellion. This time physical force had clearly brought success, but, as with the case of Belgium, the crucial element was Allied diplomatic and military support for the nationalists. Robin Fedden stresses the almost accidental nature of this battle, which had a great influence on the later inability of the Ottomans to stand up to Balkan nationalism. Some top level answers may note that there were other, less obvious successes for nationalism during this early period, and that these owed nothing to "physical force." The growth of the *Zollverein*, although conceived and developed by Prussia for its own economic benefit, nonetheless acted as a spur for those who hoped that a German free trade bloc could lead on to political union. The historian Mark Hewitson's interpretation supports this view. Although Mazzini's practical efforts were derisory, his influence as a thinker and inspiration to others, prominent among them Garibaldi, was an important factor in the development of Italian nationalism. Useful interpretative material can be found in Mazzini's speeches, such as the one he made on 25 July 1848, in Milan. Finally, writers, musicians, artists and painters often helped, to stimulate patriotism and a sense of nationalism in their fellow-countrymen. The Brothers Grimm revived interest in German folk culture, while Arndt and Jahn encouraged a sense of German nationalism. Kossuth, the editor of the newspaper *Pesti Hirlap*, beat the drum for Hungarian independence, and Verdi's operas often contained coded cries for Italian freedom from perceived Austrian oppression. (The lyrics of "The Chorus of the Hebrew Slaves" were seen as an unofficial anthem, and could be quoted as contemporary interpretation.)

(c) The 1860s saw, probably, the peak of "nationalist success", with the unification of Italy and Germany, and virtual "home rule" for Hungary. Previous attempts to expel Austria and its influence from Italy, whether by persuasion, revolution or, as in 1848–1849, war, had all failed. The success of 1860 was firmly based on physical force, the difference this time being the utilisation of outside help. The recruitment of Napoleon III by the Piedmontese Cavour should be seen as pivotal, the intervention of French troops leading to the expulsion of the Habsburgs from Lombardy, to the destruction of their influence in the duchies, and to their impotence in protecting Papal territories. A.J.P. Taylor believes that Cavour's recognition of the need for outside help to be "his greatest achievement". Garibaldi's separate campaign of the Thousand complemented the events in the north, eventually adding the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to the new Italy. Venetia

and Rome were annexed in 1866 and 1870 as a result of "physical force", with Prussian military victories over Austria and France. Nationalists were, it may be argued, sidelined by most of these events, with Piedmontese aggrandisement all-important, and some may argue that Italian unification was not therefore a nationalist success. Similarly, Prussian hegemony rather than a genuinely nationalist German nationalist movement has been argued as a more appropriate interpretation of the events of the 1860s, but undoubtedly the unification of Germany resulted from Bismarck's use of physical force. "Nationalist success" came after Bismarck fought against Denmark in 1864, partly to attract German nationalist support, partly to entrap Austria. Austria fell into the trap, quarrelling over the future of the captured Schleswig-Holstein, seeking to teach the supposedly upstart Prussia a lesson, enlisting the help of the states of the German Confederation, and losing, humiliatingly, in seven weeks during the summer of 1866. The artist von Kügelgen, describing Bismarck as "now the most popular man in Prussia" neatly interprets how even his liberal enemies were won over by nationalist success. Prussia was able to set up the North German Confederation after this, and Bismarck utilised physical force again in 1870, luring France into a foolish declaration of war, after which the southern states were forced to throw in their lot with the new German Empire, declared in 1871. It was a Prussian rather than a German success, but in time was perceived as a nationalist one, and had been achieved due to Prussian ambition and economic superiority, Bismarckian diplomacy, but, in the final analysis, "physical force". Austrian weakness had become apparent in the 1859 and 1866 wars, and it was in this enfeebled state that it was finally obliged to surrender to Magyar pressure and make the compromise, or *Ausgleich*, of 1867, establishing the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, which freed the latter country from subjugation to Austria. Coming as it did in the immediate wake of the Seven Weeks War, this was clearly another triumph for physical force. Brian Bond's analysis of the effects of the wars of the 1860s is useful interpretation.

(d) After 1870 there were further successes for nationalism, but nothing on the scale of Italy or Germany. Where successes did occur, they were usually dependent on war. Thus, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1888, Bulgaria received freedom from Ottoman rule after nearly five centuries. Although the Congress of Berlin reduced the size of the "Big Bulgaria", the Bulgarian defeat of the Serbs allowed it to retake Eastern Rumelia in 1885, restoring more of its historic territory. The Balkan Wars allowed a further nationalist success, when Albania was created in 1913. The exception to the rule of "physical force" was Norway, which split peacefully from Sweden in 1905. Some answers might refer to the failure of Czechs, Irish, Poles and Southern Slavs, despite constant campaigning, to achieve freedom before 1914, yet they did so after the First World War, an argument for the proposition. There were other forms of "nationalist success", at least in the eyes of the governments which promoted them: namely the encouragement of patriotism, the admiration of military values, even in a civilian context, and a semi-religious cult of nation-worship, with flags, anthems and nationalist pageantry. Pan-Slavism, encouraged by the Russian government, and Pan-Germanism, a semi-official movement, were part of this trend. General von Liebert's writings on the need to expand to encompass all Germans could be referred to as contemporary interpretation. Some have argued that the rush to enlist in 1914 would not have been so enthusiastic without this

conditioning, found across Europe. These "successes" were not the result of "physical force", but some answers may argue that they resulted in it.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately [50]

Option 3

AVAILABLE MARKS
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Option 4: Unionism and Nationalism in Ireland 1800–1900

Answer **one** question.

1 "Irish nationalists could only succeed when British governments were weak, but would always fail when British governments were strong." How far would you agree with this assessment of the reasons for the successes and failures of constitutional and revolutionary nationalism in Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question requires an assessment of the importance of the strength of the British Government in the success of constitutional and revolutionary nationalism.

The structure of the answer is immaterial; whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) O'Connell was helped in his pursuit of Catholic Emancipation by the weakness of the government. Wellington's weakness as Prime Minister, coupled with the divisions within the Tories, and the splits between Wellington and Peel, led to a situation where Emancipation became more likely. The unfortunate precedent set by having to pass the Test and Corporations Act left no moral argument by which he could then refuse Catholic Emancipation.

There were other factors which helped constitutional nationalists. O'Connell's own charisma, tactics and political intelligence were vital. His recognition of the crisis at Westminster also contributed to his success. He was able to pressurise the government after his election in County Clare and his tactics of rhetoric, mass rallies and contesting by-elections made sure that the British could not ignore the growing demand for Emancipation. O'Connell also enjoyed the support of the Catholic Church. The clergy openly endorsed him and collected the 'Penny Rent'. Adelman has commented that O'Connell rightly realised the role of the parish priests in spreading the message of the Association.

The role of mass support is also relevant. The Church helped to this end but O'Connell mobilised the masses through the organisation and agitation of the Catholic Association and the collection of the Penny Rent in order to create a fully mobilised mass movement. As well as Catholic support, O'Connell was also successful in reaching out to Presbyterians and in gaining support from some English MPs in the House of Commons, all of which helped in the achievement of Emancipation.

(b) O'Connell's successes with his reforms such as the Education Reform of 1832 and the Irish Church Act of 1833 could be discussed, along with those in the years of the Lichfield House Compact. Weaknesses in the Whig governments after 1835 allowed O'Connell to negotiate the Compact. MacDonagh argued that O'Connell was more committed to reform than Repeal and responses could also discuss how O'Connell was disappointed with the Compact, as the Lords were able to veto almost all legislation, despite the progress made under Drummond as Irish Under-Secretary.

(c) The campaign for the Repeal of the Union was different and its failure can be explained by many factors. The strength of Peel's government and his campaign of reforms for Ireland such as the Maynooth grant, did damage to the repeal campaign. Peel was at the head of a unified Tory party which was not as easy to manipulate as Wellington had been. O'Connell was also not the leader he once was and this was evident from the reduction in the O'Connell tribute during his later years. His duplication of tactics from the Emancipation campaign, with the creation of the Repeal Association, the Repeal rent and the monster meetings allowed Peel to outmanoeuvre him. The Church was less committed to repeal than it had been to Emancipation, seeing it as a more radical political issue. The Church wanted to wait and see what benefits Emancipation would bring and arguably never saw the need to support Repeal in the same way. Church support for Repeal was restricted to a few higher ranking Bishops, but the members of the priesthood were less enthusiastic.

O'Connell still managed to attract mass popular support to his cause but it was not as effective this time. The support of Presbyterians was lukewarm and the masses did not buy into the idea of Repeal, partly due to O'Connell's lack of clarity on it. The decision to ally with Young Ireland backfired since he could not control the movement and led to a split. It also made him appear like a radical firebrand and gave Peel the excuse he wanted to suppress the Repeal Association.

(d) Isaac Butt enjoyed some limited success in the formative years of the Home Rule campaign. Butt never enjoyed mass popular support and his Home Rule movement was characterised by loyalty to the British establishment in the hope of concessions. This brought some success in that Home Rule became an issue at Westminster; however, Butt's subservience eventually cost him his leadership and his support. The Church was indifferent to Butt's campaign because it was nowhere near the force Home Rule would later become under Parnell.

(e) The strengths and weaknesses of the British governments also partly help account for the success of Parnell. There can be little doubt that Parnell was helped by the fact that Gladstone had become determined to 'pacify Ireland.' Parnell would maybe not have achieved so much without the backing of such a powerful ally, or if the British government or the Prime Minister had been hostile towards his desires. Parnell also had the backing of the Catholic Church. Lyons could be used here to illustrate the support given to Parnell and the Home Rule Party by the Church in this period. Parnell's own leadership was also relevant. His ability to mobilise mass support was a key factor. His association with the Land League and men such as Davitt led to the creation of the New Departure, which brought together mass popular support, the endorsement of the Catholic Church and co-operation with some of the more radical elements of Irish nationalism. According to Larkin: "The Church had taken this step and allied with Parnell, out of necessity and a need to remain relevant." Parnell helped to confront the Irish land question and successes were the Land Act of 1881 and the Arrears Act of 1882. Parnell's oratorical skills were also outstanding, such as when he claimed: "But no man has the right to fix the boundary to the march of a nation. No man has the right to say to his country, this far shalt thou go and no farther.'

AVAILABLE MARKS

	AVAILABLE MARKS

The IPP's success in the general election of 1885, winning 86 seats showed how mass support contributed to success. Parnell's failure, downfall and death can be explained by a combination of factors. The O'Shea scandal alienated the Church, which denounced Parnell. The scandal caused division in his own party, forcing Gladstone to distance himself from Parnell due to the backlash, showing the importance of the British government. This shows that, even with mass popular support, Irish nationalism could still suffer devastating defeats and losses.

(f) The role of respective British governments in leading to the success or failure of revolutionary nationalism should also be discussed. The British government acted in a way that was sufficient to suppress each rebellion. In 1803, the government easily suppressed Emmet's attempts and even had knowledge in the preceding weeks that an attempt was likely. The revolt of Young Ireland in 1848 was firmly dealt with by the British authorities. Several counties had been proclaimed in 1847 under the Crime and Outrage Act, prosecutions were pursued against the leadership of Young Ireland, such as O'Brien, Meagher and Mitchel, and the badly organised military action was easily suppressed. The role of government was also a key determinant in the failure of the Fenians in 1867, and their revolt was easily crushed by a combination of firm leadership a strong military and political response, such as the suspension of Habeas Corpus, and infiltration. Informants such as Nagel had fed back accurate intelligence, Fenian newspapers were suppressed and Irish regiments with suspected Fenian sympathies were suspended. The Fenians also inspired Gladstone into a frenetic campaign of Irish reforms which denied them support.

Answers should, however, reflect on the other factors which contributed to the failure of revolutionary nationalists. Their failure to build up mass popular support did contribute to their lack of success in this period. There was little public support for either Emmet's rebellion of 1803 or the Young Ireland rebellion of 1848 and both were relatively easily suppressed. In none of the three rebellions of the nineteenth century did there appear any significant spontaneous support for any of the rebels. However, the point could also be made that revolutionary nationalists, by their very nature, never sought mass popular support. Inadequate planning and preparation was a common feature in all three rebellions. Emmet in 1803 received no Church backing but his failure was due to poor planning, a lack of support and a lack of resources. The Church was also suspicious of the Young Irelanders long before their rebellion in 1848 and so gave no support to the group but again other reasons were more important in leading to their failure. The Fenian Rebellion of 1867 faced the additional problem of almost total condemnation from the Catholic Church and establishment, largely because of the views and overwhelming presence of Cardinal Cullen. As Bishop Moriarty claimed at the time: "Hell is not hot enough nor eternity long enough to roast the Fenians." The Fenians also suffered divisions in their leadership, both in Ireland and the USA. The views of Moody could be utilised here to assess the failure of the Fenians. The unrealistic aspirations of some of the revolutionaries could also be discussed, as well as the importance of external factors, such as the hardships being endured during the Young Ireland rebellion of 1848 due to the famine, making any chance of success disappear.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.   [50]   50

AVAILABLE MARKS

2 "Despite their common goal of preserving the Act of Union, they had little else to unite them." How far would you accept this view of the motives and methods of the supporters of the Union in the north and south of Ireland in the period 1800–1900?

This question requires an assessment of the motives and methods of those who supported the Union in the north and the south of Ireland, making sustained and substantiated comparisons and contrasts. Candidates should examine the attitudes towards the Union held by its supporters in the north and south of Ireland and be able to identify some areas of common ground and disagreement between southern and Ulster unionists regarding their motives. Similarities and differences should also be pointed out in the methods employed by both groups of unionists.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) The supporters of the Union in the north and south shared common aims about their economic welfare if Home Rule was introduced. These motives were in fact the primary concern of northern unionists. There was a fear that Ulster's economic prosperity would be threatened if the Union was broken. It was a frequently articulated argument that the welfare of Ulster's industries, namely shipbuilding, linen and rope works, hinged on Britain's relationship with Ireland and on the success and continuance of the Union. Ulster was also viewed as economically different from the rest of Ireland due to its industry and this depended on the continuance of the Union. Ulster unionists attributed all of the economic progress of the north directly to the Union. As Henry Cooke said: "Look at Belfast and be a Repealer if you can." Repeal and Home Rule were believed by the vast majority to symbolise the destruction of Ulster's prosperity. This caused many Liberals to transfer their allegiance to unionism, such as Thomas Sinclair, who firmly believed that Home Rule would spell economic disaster for Ulster. Rees and Kee have observed that the economic concerns over Home Rule were the most important motives for Ulster Unionists.

Economic motives were important for southern unionists. Many southern unionists had experienced unease over their prosperity and position due to the passing of various land acts in the second half of the nineteenth century. The social structure of southern unionism also helps to account for these economic fears, as many prominent families had their wealth bound up in landed estates and they preferred their fortunes to be controlled by an English Parliament than an Irish Home Rule Parliament. McDowell argued that southern unionists were fearful of the changes that an Irish Parliament would bring to land ownership in Ireland, showing how economic concerns influenced their opposition to Home Rule. The fears of southern unionists had been heightened by legislation such as the Ballot Act of 1872 and the Reform Act of 1884, which loosened landlord control over their tenants' voting intentions. The social structure of southern unionists also meant that they feared for their agricultural prosperity with any change to the Union. These reforms of the later nineteenth century led to increasing unease amongst southern unionists as their position became threatened.

(b) The Empire and the imperial ideal were a more prominent theme among southern unionists than in the north, thereby indicating differences in aims. Fears for the well-being of the Empire were more prominent amongst southern unionists. The belief was widespread that Home Rule would weaken the Empire worldwide. Southern views on the Empire can also be linked again to the social structure of southern unionism as so many of their members served the Empire. Southern unionists were more able to see the Irish situation in a more global or imperial context, as a great many of their number had served the Empire abroad. Lansdowne, for example, was a Viceroy of India, Secretary of State for Canada and eventually Secretary of State for War. Midleton and Dunraven had also served the Empire in high-ranking diplomatic roles. Southern unionists were also keen to highlight Ireland's part within the world's greatest Empire and draw contrasts to the diminished position that an independent Ireland would hold on the world stage. It could also be argued that, because of their position as a minority within the rest of Ireland, southern unionists had to use fear for the Empire to appeal to others in order to build up support for their cause in the south.

Fears over Empire were also prevalent in the north, although arguably less so. The concern of Ulster unionists for the Empire was linked to the economic prosperity they enjoyed as members of it. The prosperity of Ulster was in their minds, due to the benefits of global trade with Britain and the wider Empire and it could be claimed that their Imperial motives were really economic at their core. The possibility of a 'domino effect' across the rest of the Empire was also felt by and used by unionists. Imperial concerns undoubtedly brought many prominent English supporters to back Ulster unionism. There were high-profile Ulster unionists who had served highly in the Empire such as the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, Viceroy of India, and John Ballance, who would become Prime Minister of New Zealand. Responses may debate the relative balance of motivating factors in assessing the fears and overall motivation of northern unionists.

(c) Religious concerns and motives were very different between the supporters of the Union, north and south. Religious fears were at the forefront of Ulster unionist fears as the north had a very different religious demographic to the rest of Ireland and experienced more sectarian tension. Ulster Protestants numbered 800 000 out of a population of 1.25 million. Northern unionists expressed their religious fears if the Union was broken. The link with geographical distribution explains the focus on religion, especially during the Home Rule debates as those in the north felt they had more to lose from Home Rule. The views of Buckland could be used to explain these aspects. There was also a belief that all Protestants had to work together to combat what was seen as a growing danger from Catholicism and, as such, the views of men like Rev. Henry Cooke could also be discussed: "Protestants have to overcome their denominational differences and learn to work together to combat the growing Catholic threat." The variety of organisations formed, such as the Protestant Defence Association and the Ulster Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union, also show how northern unionists perceived themselves and how prominent a role religion played in both their motivation and identity.

Religious fears were also existent in the south but again due to demographics, to a much lesser extent. The scattered southern unionist community played down the theme of religious differences and instead concentrated on the idea that the Union benefited Irishmen regardless of religion. As a small and fragmented minority, they depended upon

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the goodwill of their Catholic neighbours. Southern unionists numbered approximately 250 000 out of a population of 2.25 million. They made arguments about the benefits of the Union for all religions. Catholics were made welcome into southern unionist organisations, and these organisations such as the Cork Defence Union, articulated in 1885 that "the Union is non-sectarian and non-political." Southern unionists were also always keen to stress their importance to the wider unionist movement. As William Kenny a Catholic MP for Dublin stated in 1892: "We are determined to show that unionist Ireland is not represented by Ulster alone." Top responses should debate where the balance in motivation lay with southern unionists as well.

(d) There were notable differences in the methods employed by the supporters of the Union. A discussion of the methods of both Ulster and southern unionists is relevant to any discussion of their motives. In particular, answers should address the physical force aspect suggested in the question, commenting on the degree to which Ulster and southern Unionists felt that the use of violence would be necessary. Geographical considerations impacted greatly on the methods of unionists. In the north, unionists could be confident, outspoken and even radical in their defence of the Union, sometimes hinting at the use of force. Members of Young Ulster, for example, were required to possess a firearm and ammunition. The Protestant Colonisation Society believed that the best way to protect the property of its members was to ban marriage between Protestants and Catholics. The Ulster Defence Union collected funds for the organisation of resistance to Home Rule.

Southern unionists could never use the same methods due to their permanent minority status in the remaining three provinces, therefore making the use of violence unrealistic. It was, however, also undesirable for southern unionists, as they were keen to promote their image as 'loyal' subjects of both Britain and the Empire. Southern unionists were therefore more likely to use peaceful methods. However, southern unionists were able to exert their influence in the House of Lords, as well as use their considerable financial power to back their defence of the Union. The veto possessed by the Lords in this period was a constant reminder of just how powerful the political contacts of southern unionists were to the cause. By 1886, there were 144 peers in the House of Lords with some kind of vested Irish interest. The ILPU financed many election contests in Britain and Ireland. Southern unionists also had a lot of support from newspapers such as the *Irish Times* and the *Dublin Daily Express*. Even the titles of the organisation set up to defend the union could be discussed. In the south, the word "Irish" was prominent, whilst in the north it was usually the word "Ulster." This suggests differences in the self-perception of unionists.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately.   [50]   50

Option 4	**50**

Option 5: Clash of Ideologies in Europe 1900–2000

Answer **one** question.

1   "Between 1917 and 1941 Soviet foreign policy in Europe was primarily defensive; from 1942 to 1991 it was mainly aggressive." How far would you accept this verdict?

This question requires an assessment of how far Soviet foreign policy could be considered to be defensive or aggressive across different time periods.

Top level responses will address the assumption that Soviet foreign policy can be viewed in such a binary manner and whether or not those distinct periods are as coherent as the statement suggests.

The structure of the answer is largely immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) **1917–1924**
     This period deals with Lenin's years in power and allows candidates to assess how accurate the first part of the statement may be. Candidates could seek to argue that there is no simple depiction of Soviet foreign policy during this initial period. As Condren remarked, the "Soviet leadership pursued its aims with whatever means were at its disposal." The importance of events and circumstances were to shape decisions and as a result the policy switched from being aggressive to defensive.

     In discussing this issue, candidates would be expected to consider the Soviet withdrawal from World War One, the Civil War, the creation of the Comintern, the Russo-Polish War and the diplomatic treaties which were signed with Britain and Germany in the early 1920s. Each of these events is certainly open to interpretation and candidates may seek to argue that Soviet foreign policy was aggressive, as evident through the creation of the Comintern or the Russo-Polish War. Indeed, candidates could draw upon Kennan's argument that the Soviet Union was "inherently aggressive" due to its revolutionary nature to challenge the statement. Equally, candidates could argue that the Civil War was defensive in so far as it was a reaction against the desire of Churchill to "strangle Bolshevism in the cradle." Such defensive actions are also reflected in the diplomatic treaties of the early 1920s.

(b) **1924–1941**
     With the death of Lenin and the emergence of Stalin, it is important to consider if the new leadership marked a change in the direction of Soviet foreign policy. Candidates may want to address the ideological divisions that emerged during this period. A contrast could be drawn between Stalin's more inward-looking policies and his commitment to securing the revolution at home and Trotsky's belief in the importance of exporting Bolshevism. As Lynch has commented, Stalin "continued [Lenin's policies] by adopting an essentially defensive attitude to the outside world."

With the rise of fascism in Germany, candidates will want to consider whether Stalin altered Soviet foreign policy and, if so, in which direction. The 1930s offer ample opportunities to consider the validity of the statement. Candidates may wish to argue in support of the statement, highlighting the lengths to which the Soviet Union went in order to counter the fascist threat. The joining of the League of Nations, which Lenin had previously disparaged as a "robbers' den", the signing of various non-aggression pacts and the willingness to "take up arms" against the swelling fascist sea in Spain could all be used to illustrate the non-aggressive and very defensive nature of Soviet foreign policy during this period.

However, the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 could be argued to be a prime example of the Soviet Union's aggressive expansionism. The division of northern and eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence could be offered as examples of the aggressive impulse within Soviet foreign policy. Equally, it could be argued that the pact emerged as a result of the failure of Western democratic powers to stand up to Hitler, and, as such, the Soviet move was defensive in character. This very debate offers candidates the opportunity to delve into the interpretations concerning this period. It is possible to strengthen the historical discussion with reference to the arguments of both the Collective Security school and the German school of historians.

(c) 1941–1945
The invasion of the Soviet Union led to a defensive response and the subsequent war would largely be considered defensive. Candidates may want to highlight events such as the apparent decision by the Red Army in August 1944 to wait at the Vistula while the Nazis crushed the Warsaw Rebellion, thereby removing a potential barrier to Soviet control of Poland after the war. Equally, candidates could draw attention to the Percentages Agreement, in October 1944, as an indication of Soviet expansionist and aggressive intentions.

(d) 1945–1963
The effective "takeover" of large swathes of eastern and central Europe presents candidates with a further opportunity to weigh up the merits of the statement. Whether this was the result of a Soviet desire for a sphere of influence that could act as a buffer zone or the logical consequence of communist ideology is for candidates to argue. Once again, answers could highlight this discussion by drawing on the interpretations of the Orthodox school and contrasting it with the Revisionist approach.

The Berlin Blockade of 1948 could be understood in a number of ways. Candidates may suggest that the Soviet Union was responding to policies its opponents were pursuing and was essentially defensive in character, or they could argue it was primarily an aggressive attempt to ensure ideological control of East Germany or that it represents the first stage of an attempt to expand communism into western Europe.

With the death of Stalin it appeared that Soviet foreign policy took on a more conciliatory tone. This may be analysed from a number of angles: it could be considered a return to the pragmatism of the Lenin years, a return to "peaceful co-existence," as Khrushchev expressed it, a reaction

to the economic problems the country faced or merely a policy designed to placate the West, while remaining ruthlessly aggressive within Eastern Europe. Candidates will want to consider a number of events in relation to Khrushchev's rule, such as the development of the Geneva Spirit, the creation of the Warsaw Pact, events in Hungary in 1956 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

Candidates may seek to use the events mentioned to support the claim of the statement or indeed they can use the same events to challenge it. For example, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 can be viewed as an essentially defensive act in so far as it was attempting to preserve the integrity of East Germany. Equally, it could reasonably be argued that it was aggressive, most notably to the German population. However, as Evans and Jenkins have argued, there was a noticeable difference between Khrushchev and his predecessor: "If his aims were much the same as those of Stalin, Khrushchev differed in his approach."

The highest quality answers will be able to highlight how foreign policy can be two things at the one time without actually being inconsistent or contradictory. For example, it is entirely possible to argue that Soviet foreign policy was exceptionally aggressive as it maintained totalitarian control through force in eastern Europe but at the same time sought improved relations with the west through summits and diplomatic relations.

(e) **1964–1982**
With the replacement of Khrushchev by Brezhnev, candidates can consider the reasons for the change of leader and the issues that confronted the new leadership and how this impacted upon the nature of Soviet foreign policy. Most notably candidates will be expected to consider Soviet relations with the nations of the Eastern Bloc, West Germany and the United States. Attention could be drawn to the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the subsequent announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Arguments could be made to suggest that the latter was an example of aggression and could hardly be characterised as defensive in character. The emergence of *Ostpolitik* and subsequently détente provides opportunities for candidates to assess how such policies should be understood.

Détente, it may be suggested, was merely the latest expression of co-existence and thus was defensive in character. As Mason has argued: "Détente was a device to minimise tension and avoid dangerous crises." However, the Soviet Union remained ideologically committed to communism and improvements in relations were thus designed to maintain communism if not export it. Alternatively, candidates could argue that the Soviet Union was beset by economic problems it was unable to solve. Indeed, such problems were only going to get worse in the following decade. Candidates may thus want to challenge the statement and question how useful it is to limit foreign policy to being either defensive or aggressive.

The end of détente occasions consideration of the impact of the war in Afghanistan on the Soviet Union's relationship with the West in Europe. It is perfectly legitimate to use it as an exploration of why détente in Europe came to an end, but there is no credit to be gained from any lengthy discussion of it.

Further analysis could suggest that Washington brought an end to détente as the USA realised the duplicitous nature of the Soviet Union and how its actions posed, to paraphrase President Carter, the greatest threat to world peace since World War Two and, as his successor was to observe, it was in fact "an Evil Empire."

(f) 1982–1985

The death of Brezhnev and short-lived rule of both Andropov and Chernenko need not detain candidates unduly. However, candidates could note that Andropov was more of a reformer, whereas Chernenko was to revert to type as a hardline conservative.

(g) 1985–1991

Candidates may point out that the tensions that had built up under Brezhnev had not been resolved by his immediate successors and it was these tensions that Gorbachev was to inherit and which were to have such a dramatic impact on Soviet foreign policy under his rule. As McCauley has written: "If Lenin was the founder of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was its grave digger."

While candidates will no doubt give due attention to his domestic reforms, it was the changes he introduced in Soviet foreign policy that were to be of greater significance. His willingness to remove troops from Afghanistan, to unilaterally disarm and reject the Brezhnev doctrine will all require analysis. Candidates may decide that, while Gorbachev considered himself to be a communist, his refusal to maintain the buffer zone, his willingness to abandon the Brezhnev Doctrine and his rejection of Marxist-Leninism as an unassailable truth resulted in the most defensive foreign policy of any leader. Indeed, it was Gorbachev who oversaw the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of communism throughout Europe and the Soviet Union.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

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2 "The opponents of communism in Europe were more successful between 1917 and 1941 than in the period 1942–1991." To what extent would you agree with this statement?

This question requires an assessment of the extent to which the opponents of the Soviet Union were more successful in the years between 1917 and 1941 than the subsequent fifty years.

Top level responses will reflect that different opponents had different aims at different times and assess how successful these aims were. They will be able to make clear distinction between the different periods and within those periods as appropriate.

The structure of the answer is immaterial: whether thematic or chronological, adherence to the issues in the question and the quality of evidence is the requirement for creditable marks.

Answers may deploy some of the following knowledge and contemporary and later interpretations:

(a) 1917–1933
Candidates may argue that there was little initial success for the opponents of communism. There was a clear desire to destroy the Soviet Union evidenced through the involvement of France and Britain in the Civil War on the side of the Whites. As Churchill remarked, he wanted to see Bolshevism strangled "in the cradle." However, the revolution survived. Limited success could be attributed to the Polish government. While failing to destroy Bolshevism, it did manage to avoid becoming the "red bridge into Europe" that Lenin had hoped to create as a result of the Russo-Polish War.

Subsequently, as Hobsbawm has asserted, the "victorious allies wanted to make the world safe from Bolshevism" and it would appear that they did achieve this aim. Despite treaties such as the Anglo-Soviet Trade agreement of 1921, relations with Britain were hostile, as evidenced in both the Curzon Ultimatum of 1923 and the Zinoviev letter of 1924, and the initial fire of revolutionary expansionism had dampened considerably.

The Soviet Union was forced to work with fellow pariah nation Germany. The Treaty of Rapallo in 1922 and the subsequent Treaty of Berlin in 1926 reflected the isolated nature of the Soviet Union. Certainly, if the aim of the Bolsheviks had been to see the "workers of the world unite," they had singularly failed in this aim and by this measure the opponents of the Soviet Union could be deemed successful.

(b) 1933–1941
The rise of fascism was to witness the near collapse of the Soviet Union. Candidates could argue that this period witnesses the greatest successes of some of the opponents of communism. The rise of fascism in Italy, Germany and Spain was at the expense of indigenous communist parties and whether it was by intent, or as a result of genuine weakness, Moscow seemed to be retreating inwards and had become exceptionally vulnerable. As Stalin himself insisted, the Soviet Union was in danger of being "destroyed" if it did not industrialise with unprecedented speed.

Such was the desperation of Moscow that it was forced to join the League of Nations, and also seek mutual assistance pacts with former capitalist enemies in an attempt to avoid conflict with Nazi Germany. Hitler had been explicit in his intentions to destroy communism and, even though he was to perform an "ideological somersault" (Ward) with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, the Nazis were very close to defeating the world's only Bolshevik state by 1941.

Candidates could equally challenge the proposition by highlighting the failure of Britain and France to avoid war and argue that they were singularly unsuccessful and that the policy of appeasement produced a Nazi-Soviet alliance, which was what Stalin had wanted, as Tucker has argued.

(c) 1941–1945

The creation of the Grand Alliance may have been "a marriage of convenience" but it does allow candidates to challenge the question and argue that it was in this immediate period after 1941 that one of the main opponents of communism was to be comprehensively unsuccessful. The success of the Red Army against the Nazis led to not only the collapse of fascist Germany but the Soviet takeover of eastern Europe and the defeat of other fascist forces ranging from the Ukraine to Croatia and Hungary.

(d) 1945–1953

Candidates can adopt different approaches to the immediate years after the Second World War. It can be argued that the opponents of communism were very unsuccessful in view of the Soviet takeover of eastern Europe. By 1948 a "Red Empire" had been established across much of the continent. The promises of free elections at the war-time conferences had not been kept. The western allies proved powerless to assist democratic movements in the newly liberated states, most notably Poland.

However, candidates could argue that, despite the territorial gains made by the Soviet Union, the opponents of communism were highly successful. Communism did not spread to the devastated countries of western Europe. Communism was defeated in Greece and kept at bay in West Germany, as Soviet aggression in Berlin was met with a determined and successful response in the form of the Berlin airlift. Furthermore, the establishment of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Aid and NATO in 1948 highlighted a much more secure and coherent approach from the opponents of communism to the threat of the Soviet Union. Such a determined approach was rooted in sentiments such as those of General Clay that if Berlin fell, Germany would be next and indeed Truman's own assertion at Potsdam that the "only thing the Russians understand is force."

A more balanced approach could highlight that, while there were certainly some successes, Churchill's dramatic claim of an "iron curtain" was indeed accurate. Much of eastern Europe was lost to Soviet control and the opponents of communism seemed to be on the retreat.

(e) 1953–1968

Despite occasional divergences within the opponents of communism, such as the French withdrawal from NATO between 1959 and 1966, there was nothing resembling the divisions of the opponents of the Soviet Union in the 1920s or 1930s. Indeed, one would expect candidates to comment not only

on the absence of divisions but also the shared aims which primarily focused around containment of the Soviet Union in terms of its influence in eastern Europe and the absence of any communist threat in the western democratic states.

While the express aim may have been to contain communism, candidates may want to note that there was a clear limit to this policy. Whether it was the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the Berlin Wall in 1961 or the Prague Spring of 1968, the opponents of communism limited themselves to strong denunciations but took no military action. In this regard, while they were able to contain communism in Europe, they were unable to erode its influence in those states that remained within the straitjacket of eastern Europe. Thus, there was limited success for the opponents of communism at this point.

Equally, candidates may argue that the opponents of communism also sought stability. The nuclear age witnessed a series of measures designed to stabilise superpower relations, most obviously the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Hotline that was established between the White House and the Kremlin, also in 1963. As Gaddis has argued: "Kennedy tried to lower the [nuclear] risks, without much help...from his Kremlin counterpart." In this sense the opponents of communism were not completely successful.

(f) **1968–1979**
Candidates may suggest that, as far as Europe was concerned, stability was the primary aim during this period and to a large extent the opponents of communism succeeded in achieving this. The development of détente and SALT I and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 could be seen as further evidence of this process, whereby peaceful co-existence became the policy aim and the methods were those of traditional diplomacy. However, this argument may be overstated and, in view of the continued emphasis on nuclear weapons by the USA, it could be asserted that détente was more of a pause in the intensity of the Cold War than a change. As Stephen Ambrose has argued, the US commitment to arms reductions was largely weak, pointing out that throughout the Nixon administration "the Pentagon added three new warheads a day to the MIRV arsenal."

However, it is also possible to argue that the opponents of communism were planting a time bomb within the Soviet Union and eastern Europe with regard to the commitment to Human Rights encapsulated in the Helsinki Final Act. Thus, while it may appear that success was limited in the short term, subsequent events were to vindicate the importance of this policy.

(g) **1979–1991**
After 1979 a clear departure from such stability can be seen with the emergence of the Second Cold War. Candidates may argue that this was a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or equally the emergence of an ideologically hardline axis between Washington and London. With regard to the former, Carter viewed the invasion of Afghanistan as the "greatest threat to world peace" since World War Two. One would anticipate candidates drawing attention to both the rhetoric and the willingness of the United States to invest in a new range of nuclear weapons and the so called "Star Wars" programme.

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Candidates may also draw attention to the change in relations brought about by the emergence of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and the role that this played in the collapse of communism.

Candidates could argue that the ensuing collapse of communism was the result of the policies of the USA or that it came about as a result of the policies of the leadership of the Soviet Union. In conclusion, a number of possible interpretations are viable and candidates may fruitfully explore them. They may argue that it was indeed the opponents of communism who brought about its demise and thus challenge the question or they may argue it was in fact the inherent structural weaknesses of the Soviet Union that saw it relinquish its control of eastern Europe and its own subsequent implosion.

Any other valid material will be rewarded appropriately. [50]

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Option 5	**50**