



**HISTORY**  
**HIGHER AND STANDARD LEVEL**  
**PAPER 1**

Friday 2 November 2001 (afternoon)

1 hour

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**INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer:
  - either all questions in Section A;
  - or all questions in Section B;
  - or all questions in Section C.

*Texts in this examination paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses in square brackets [...]; minor changes are not indicated. Candidates should answer the questions in order.*

## SECTION A

### Prescribed Subject 1 The Russian Revolutions and the New Soviet State 1917–1929

These documents refer to the period 1918 to 1923, with Lenin in power.

**DOCUMENT A** *Lenin justifies the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, 5 to 6 January 1918, in one of his many writings of 1918.*

Those who point out that we are now ‘dissolving’ the Constituent Assembly, although at one time we defended it, are not displaying a grain of sense, but are merely uttering pompous and meaningless phrases. At one time we considered the Constituent Assembly to be better than Tsarism and the Republic of Kerensky, but as the Soviets emerged, being revolutionary organisations of the whole people, they naturally became far superior to any parliament in the world, a fact that I emphasised as far back as last April. By completely smashing bourgeois and landed property and by facilitating [making possible] the final upheaval which is sweeping away all traces of the bourgeois system, the Soviets impelled [led] us on the path that has led the people to organise their own lives.

The people wanted the Constituent Assembly summoned and we summoned it. But they sensed immediately what this famous Constituent Assembly really was. And now we have carried out the will of the people which is, “All power to the Soviets”, and crushed the Constituent Assembly.

**DOCUMENT B** *Lenin’s speech at the 7th Bolshevik party congress 6 March 1918, urging acceptance of the peace treaty with Germany signed on 3 March 1918.*

It will be a good thing if the German proletariat rises up in revolution. But have you discovered such an instrument, one that will determine that the German revolution will break out on such and such a day? No, that you do not know and neither do we. You are staking everything on this card. If the [German] revolution breaks out, everything is saved. Of course. But if it does not the masses will say to you, you acted like gamblers.

A period has set in of severe defeats, inflicted by imperialism, armed to the teeth, upon a country which has demobilised its army, which had to demobilise. What I foretold has come to pass; instead of the [first] Brest-Litovsk peace, we have received a much more humiliating peace, and the blame for this rests upon those who refused to accept the former peace.

**DOCUMENT C**      *Trotsky's order to Red Army Troops, issued on 24 November 1918.*

Krasnov and the foreign capitalists who support him have thrown onto the Voronezh front hundreds of agents who have penetrated Red Army units and are inciting [encouraging] men to desert. I declare that from now on an end must be put to this by using merciless means.

1. Every scoundrel who incites anyone to retreat, or to desert, or not to carry out a military order will be shot.
2. Every soldier of the Red Army who voluntarily deserts his military post will be shot.

Death to self-seekers and to traitors!

Death to deserters and to the agents of Krasnov!

Long live the honest soldiers of the workers' Red Army!

**DOCUMENT D**      *An extract from **Lenin, Life and Legacy** by Dmitri Volkogonov, a former Colonel-General in the Soviet Army, first published in 1994, in Russia.*

There were some 80,000 churches in Russia, most of them Orthodox. Several times Unshlikht reminded Lenin of the fabulous treasures to be found in them. Finally the opportunity to deal with the Church presented itself, the famine of 1921 to 1922 [...] there were about twenty five million people starving in Russia. During this time the Party leadership was sending vast sums of money, and a large quantity of gold and treasure to foreign Communist Parties to help ignite [incite or start] world revolutions [...]. In the course of 1922 gold and treasure, much of it of Church origin, to the value of more than nineteen million gold Roubles was sent to China, India, Persia, Hungary, Italy, France, England, Germany, Finland and elsewhere in a bid to give a new impulse to the revolutionary process.

The famine meanwhile was appalling. People were eating dead bodies, although the Politburo banned any mention of cannibalism in the press. On 23 February 1922 the public learned from their newspapers that a government decree had been issued on the forcible confiscation of all valuables from Russian churches. It was not stated that this decree had first been personally approved by Lenin.

Patriarch Tikhon resisted, so Lenin personally set about formulating the Party's policy to crush the Church [...]. On 11 March 1922 he requested regular information on the number of clergy being arrested and executed.

**DOCUMENT E** *Economic Realities. Statistics put together from Soviet Sources.*

	1913	1920	1921	1922	1923
Coal (million tons)	29	8.7	8.9	9.5	13.7
Electricity (million kwhs)	1945	*	520	775	1146
Steel (thousand tons)	4231	*	183	392	709
Sown area (thousand hectares)	1500	*	90.3	77.7	91.7
Grain (million tons)	80.1	46.1	37.6	50.3	56.6

\* = no statistics available.

1. (a) According to Document E what can be inferred about the economic situation in the new Soviet state between 1918 and 1923? [2 marks]  
 (b) According to Document C what message is Trotsky intending to convey? [2 marks]
2. Analyse and account for Lenin's defensive self-justifying attitude in Documents A and B. [5 marks]
3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents C and D for historians studying Lenin's rule of USSR. [5 marks]
4. 'For Lenin the Revolution was everything, the people of Russia nothing.' Using these documents and your own knowledge, explain to what extent you agree with this assertion. [6 marks]

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## SECTION B

### **Prescribed Subject 2 Origins of the Second World War in Asia 1931–1941**

These documents relate to the Manchurian Incident, September 1931.

**DOCUMENT A**      *Extract from **The Stimson Doctrine**, 1932 (Henry Stimson was the United States Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).*

The American Government is confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorised by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate [achieve] an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any such situation. Nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, which may impair [damage] the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, or the territorial administrative integrity of the Republic of China [...].

**DOCUMENT B**      *Japanese Government Policy Statement 12 March 1932.*

The maintenance of public order in Manchuria and Mongolia will be entrusted to the Empire [Japan] [...]. Manchuria and Mongolia are the Empire's first line of defence against Russia and China; no external interference will be tolerated. In accord with these obligations, the Imperial Army forces in Manchuria will be increased appropriately and necessary naval facilities will be established, Manchuria will not be permitted its own regular army [...]. In implementing the above, **efforts will be made to avoid conflicts with international law or international treaties.**

**DOCUMENT C** *Extract from an Interview by Karl H von Wiegand with T V Soong (a Chinese financier). Reported in the United States magazine American, 2 May 1932.*


Soong's voice vibrated with feeling and bitterness. He is a man who does not talk much least of all for publication.

"And after all, is China not being driven into desperation, while the world looks on and does nothing to help us?"

By the 'world' in this instance, it was obvious that he meant the League of Nations.

"China has been invaded - invaded in Manchuria and invaded here in Shanghai - by a foreign power, that power is a member of the League of Nations, one of the signatories of the Kellogg Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, and a signatory of the Nine-Power Treaty as well. No demands were presented, either in Manchuria or here in Shanghai. None of the machinery provided in the League of Nations, in the Kellogg Anti-War Pact or in the Nine-Power Treaty, was relied upon or set in motion prior to hostilities. There was no declaration of war, but war there was - in Manchuria under the thin veil [disguise] of 'Bandit Suppression', in Shanghai in the almost cynical name of alleged 'Protection of our Nationals'. Later, even that dwindled to the 'Shanghai Incident' in the language of the invader. For a little time it was called 'a state of emergency'. So now we know some of the names that future wars will be called. The 'Shanghai Incident' - Yes, an 'incident' that has cost more than 12,000 in dead or wounded, destroyed values amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, paralysing the great commerce of Shanghai for weeks."

**DOCUMENT D** *Cartoon by David Low (a political cartoonist working in Britain), 19 January 1933.*



**THE DOORMAT.**

**DOCUMENT E**      *Extract from the Report of the Lytton Commission, Geneva, 1 October 1932.*

The Japanese [...] had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of 18-19 September, this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese [...] had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time and place. They made no concerted or authorised attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10.30 p.m. on September 18 but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the southbound train from Changchun and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence. In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence.

5. (a) According to Document E, what can be inferred about the Lytton Commission's attitude to the Manchurian Incident? [2 marks]
- (b) What political message is intended by Document D? [2 marks]
6. How consistent are Documents A, B and C in their view of the Manchurian Incident? [5 marks]
7. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Documents A and C for historians studying the Manchurian Incident. [5 marks]
8. Using these documents and your own knowledge comment on the statement in Document B that the Japanese Government made, '**efforts to avoid conflicts with international law or international treaties**', in its foreign policy between September 1931 and December 1937. [6 marks]

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### SECTION C

#### Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War 1945–1964

These documents relate to the Suez Crisis of 1956.

**DOCUMENT A**      *The USA and the Cold War.* Oliver Edwards, Hodder & Stoughton: London, 1997.

Egypt was the scene of the greatest Cold War Crisis in the Middle East under Eisenhower. The Egyptian leader was President Nasser. He was a reformer, a moderniser and above all a nationalist. His ultimate ambition was a pan-Arab coalition of states under the leadership of Egypt. The construction of the Aswan Dam on the River Nile was part of his programme of economic modernisation. The project would generate hydroelectric power and reclaim cotton-growing land.

**DOCUMENT B**      *A Cartoon History of United States Foreign Policy.* Nancy King et al. Pharos Books: New York, 1991. Thiele in the Los Angeles Mirror-News.

“Cross My Palms with Silver.”





**DOCUMENT C**      *Extract from **Withdrawal of US Support for Aswan Dam Project**, 19 July 1956. **The Cold War: A history through documents**. Edward H Judge and John W Landgon. Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1999.*

At the request of the government of Egypt, the United States joined in December 1955 with the United Kingdom and with the World Bank in an offer to assist Egypt in the construction of a high dam on the Nile at Aswan. This project is one of great magnitude. It would require an estimated 12 to 16 years to complete at a total cost estimated at some \$1,300,000,000, of which over \$900,000,000 represents local currency requirements. It involves not merely the rights and interests of Egypt but of other states whose waters are contributory, including Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda [...].

Developments within the succeeding 7 months have not been favourable to the success of the project, and the US Government has concluded that it is not feasible in the present circumstances to participate in the project. Agreement by the riparian [situated on the bank of the water] states has not been achieved, and the ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to assure the project's success has become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made.

This decision to withdraw American aid for the project in no way reflects or involves any alteration in the friendly relations of the government and people of the United States toward the government and people of Egypt [...].

**DOCUMENT D**      *Extract from a speech by President Nasser, 28 July 1956. **The Arab-Israeli Conflict**. Ian J Bickerton and M N Pearson. Longman, 1986.*

The Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian Company, subject to Egyptian sovereignty. When we nationalised the Suez Canal Company, we only nationalised an Egyptian limited company and by doing so we exercised a right which stems from the very core of Egyptian sovereignty. What right has Britain to interfere in our internal affairs? [...]

Compatriots, we shall maintain our independence and sovereignty. The Suez Canal Company has become our property, and the Egyptian flag flies over it. We shall hold it with our blood and strength, and we shall meet aggression with aggression and evil with evil. We shall proceed towards achieving dignity and prestige for Egypt and building a sound national economy and true freedom. Peace be with you.

**DOCUMENT E**      *Eisenhower, Soldier and President.* Stephen E Ambrose. Simon & Schuster, 1984.

On July 27 [1956] he [British Prime Minister Anthony Eden] sent a cable to Eisenhower, arguing that the West could not allow Nasser to seize Suez and get away with it. They must act at once, together, or American and British influence throughout the Middle East would be “irretrievably undermined.” He [Eden] said that the interests of all maritime nations were at stake, because the Egyptians did not have the technical competence to run the canal. Eden said he was preparing military plans. He said the West must be ready, as a last resort, to “bring Nasser to his senses” by force.

9. (a) According to Document A what can be inferred about the author’s perception of Nasser? [2 marks]
- (b) What political message is intended in Document B? [2 marks]
10. Compare the views offered by Documents A, B, and E. How far do they support similar views? [5 marks]
11. For historians studying the Suez Crisis, how reliable are Documents C and D? [5 marks]
12. Using these documents and your own knowledge, discuss the causes of the Suez Crisis. [6 marks]
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