



**HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Monday 9 November 2009 (afternoon)

1 hour

SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET – INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.
 - Section A page 2
 - Section B page 4
 - Section C page 7

Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION A

Prescribed Subject 1 The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941

These sources relate to collectivization under Stalin.

SOURCE A *Extract from Stalin's speech to administrators after he visited Siberia in January 1928, taken from **Collected Works**, by J V Stalin, Moscow, 1955.*

You have had a bumper harvest ... your grain surpluses this year are bigger than ever before. Yet the plan for grain procurement [something obtained by effort] is not being fulfilled. Why? Look at the kulak farms: their barns and sheds are crammed with grain ... You say that the kulaks are unwilling to deliver grain, that they are waiting for prices to rise, and prefer to engage in unbridled [unlimited] speculation. That is true. But the kulaks are demanding an increase in prices three times those fixed by the government ... But there is no guarantee that the kulaks will not again sabotage the grain procurements next year. It may be said with certainty that as long as there are kulaks, there will be sabotage of grain procurements.

SOURCE B *Opinion of a member of the Ukrainian Central Committee in 1930 taken from **The Harvest of Sorrow**, by Robert Conquest, senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Oxford, 1986.*

The peasant is adopting a new tactic. He refuses to reap the harvest. He wants the bread grain to die in order to choke the Soviet government with the bony hand of famine. We will show him what famine is. Your task is to stop the kulak sabotage of the harvest. You must bring it in to the last grain and immediately send it off to the delivery point. The peasants are not working. They are counting on previously harvested grain they have hidden in pits. We must force them to open their pits.

SOURCE C *Extract from **Stalin and His Hangmen**, by Donald Rayfield, professor of Russian literature at the University of London, London, 2005.*

Stalin's entourage [followers] were enslaved to doctrine. The kulak was to be eliminated even though he was rarely rich enough to be an exploiter but often employed poor peasants, giving them corn to survive the winter ... even worse, to meet targets for confiscation, middle peasants were arrested as kulaks. The idiocy of Stalin's policy was that the peasants who could farm the land and worked hard were turned off it, very often to die, and those who could not farm and would not work inherited the earth as members of the collective farms ... Why was there no effective protest from within or outside the party at this campaign of unprovoked violence against the class that all of Russian society professed to be the core of the nation? Was it ignorance of what was happening? Did people believe the Stalinist propaganda? ... Did dissenters fear deadly reprisals? All three factors deterred intellectuals and party workers from taking a stand. The deafening silence must lead us to conclude that Stalin's apparatus on the one hand and (the) OGPU on the other had, by 1928, established their reputations for omniscience [knowledge of all things] and ruthless intolerance.

SOURCE D *“Statistics showing agricultural output and state procurement of grain 1928-1935” from AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE USSR 1917-1991 by Alec Nove (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1969, Third edition 1992. Copyright © Alec Nove, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1982, 1989, 1992. Reproduced by permission of Penguin Books Ltd.*

	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935
Grain harvest (million tons)	73.3	71.7	83.5	69.5	69.6	68.4	67.6	75.0
State procurement of grain (million tons)	10.8	16.1	22.1	22.8	18.5	22.6	–	–
Grain exports (million tons)	0.03	0.18	4.76	5.06	1.73	1.69	–	–
Cattle (million head)	70.5	67.1	52.3	47.9	40.1	38.4	42.4	49.3
Pigs (million head)	26.0	20.4	13.6	14.4	11.6	12.1	17.4	22.6
Sheep and goats (million head)	146.7	147.0	108.8	77.7	52.1	50.2	51.9	61.1

SOURCE E *Extract from Stalin in Power, by Robert C Tucker, professor of international studies at Princeton University, Princeton, 1992.*

Khataevich, (Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee in 1933) explained, “A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It’s a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We’ve won the war.”

Just how many millions of lives were lost remains a subject of research, speculation and dispute to this day. Informed estimates range from 3 to 4 million famine deaths at the lower end to as many as 7 to 10 million at the higher ... ultimately, however, the toll [number] in death, suffering and blighted [ruined] lives resulting from terroristic collectivization and the famine, which constituted both a part and a consequence of it, defies statistical expression. Let it be said simply that Stalin’s “October” was one of our violent century’s most monstrous crimes against humanity.

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SECTION B

Prescribed Subject 2 The emergence and development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964

These sources relate to the ideological transformation of China into a socialist state.

SOURCE A *Extract from a newspaper article by Su Hsing, a writer, taken from **The People’s Daily**, Beijing, 2 February 1960.*

The Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao not only scientifically predicted the possibility of high speed growth of socialist construction in our country, but evaluated and analysed our construction experience in 1958. They worked out the general party line, aiming high, and achieving more, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism, and a set of policies of “walking on two legs”, and discovering a road that suits the Chinese realities in high speed construction of socialism. The continuous leaps forward of 1958 and 1959 indicate that socialist construction has entered a new phase in which the national economy will gain a sustained leap forward in higher speed than that during the First Five Year Plan. This is a great victory of Comrade Mao’s ideology concerning high-speed construction of socialism.

SOURCE B *Extract from a speech by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) “On the cooperative transformation of Agriculture”, 31 July 1955.*

An upsurge in the new, socialist mass movement is imminent throughout the countryside. But some of our comrades, tottering along like a woman with bound feet, are complaining all the time, “You’re going too fast, much too fast”. ... Furthermore, these comrades underrate the strength of the Communist Party’s leadership in the countryside and the peasant masses’ whole-hearted support for the Party. They believe it is difficult enough as it is for the Party to consolidate the several hundred thousand small co-operatives already in existence and therefore a large-scale expansion is simply inconceivable.

SOURCE C *Anonymous wall poster at Qinghua University entitled “I accuse, I protest”, 2 June 1957.*

I protest against Chairman Mao’s recent statement to the [Youth] League Central [Committee] that “the Party is the leadership core in all work, and any deviation from socialism is erroneous”. This statement should be translated as follows: “It is necessary to accept Party dictatorship; anyone who opposes the words of the super-emperor is wrong and should be killed forthwith.” They’ve prostituted [corrupted] the words “people” and “socialism”... The Chinese people have been deceived. When they courageously drove out the imperialists and the Chiang Kai-shek gang, they put their trust in the wrong man. We used a robber’s knife to drive out another robber. When one robber had been killed, we gave the knife to the other one. This is the key problem. Oh all you under the robber’s knife – speak out! Oh, freedom! Oh, contending! Oh, blooming! This is so-called guided democracy and centralized democracy, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) style.

SOURCE D *Photograph published in 1957, showing a struggle meeting to criticize bourgeois intellectuals at the start of the anti-Rightist campaign in July 1957. Taken from **Mao: A Life**, by Philip Short, a journalist, New York, 2001. The seated figure is a professor at Beijing University.*



SOURCE E *Extract from **Mao's China and After**, by Maurice Meisner, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, New York, 1999.*

In late 1962, with the economy stabilized, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) emerged from political seclusion [isolation] to launch the “Socialist Education Movement”. The new campaign aimed to counter bureaucratization, reverse socio-economic policies that Maoists condemned as “revisionist” and believed were creating new forms of capitalism, and revitalize a collectivistic spirit within the Party and in society at large. It was to be Mao’s last attempt, prior to the Cultural Revolution, to implement his vision of radical social transformation through existing Party and state institutions.

The campaign had its origins in a September 1962 speech to the Central Committee when Mao had set forth the thesis that classes and class struggles necessarily exist in socialist societies, stressed that the class struggle in China would continue for a prolonged period, and raised the fear that the outcome of the struggle could be a “restoration of the reactionary classes”.

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SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to Cold War developments in Cuba.

SOURCE A *Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 27 October 1962. Reproduced with the permission of the Avalon Project, Yale Law Library.*

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous [similar] means from Turkey.

The United States Government will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability [integrity] of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighbouring states.

SOURCE B *Extract from a 1985 interview between Fidel Castro and Tad Szulc, taken from **Fidel: A Critical Portrait**, by Tad Szulc, a former correspondent of the New York Times, New York, 1986. Reproduced with the permission of the Avalon Project, Yale Law Library.*

Speaking of the missiles' deployment, Castro said, "We analyzed (the fact) that this, besides being convenient for us, could also be convenient to the Soviets from a military viewpoint. This is to say that we analyzed what advantages there were for us and what advantages for them ... from the strategic viewpoint – we understood this. We reached the conclusion that this (the placing of missiles) was mutually beneficial". Castro then explained at length that it would have been "morally incorrect" for Cuba to "expect for a country to support us, even to the point of going to war, but – for reasons of prestige or to avoid military-type commitments, or for strictly political reasons – for us to fail to do what could also be convenient for the other side". Therefore, he said, "it seemed to us just, it seemed to us to be basically reciprocal to accept these measures that implied safety even though they also implied a cost from the political viewpoint".

SOURCE C *A British cartoon showing world leaders observing a card game between Kennedy and Khrushchev, published in the **Daily Mail**, London, 26 October 1962.*

“Cuban Poker Game”



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SOURCE D *Central Intelligence Agency: Special National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, 19 October 1962. Reproduced with the permission of the Avalon Project, Yale Law Library.*

A major Soviet objective in their military build-up in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere ... It is possible that the USSR is installing these missiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere. We think this unlikely, however ... if the US accepts the strategic missile buildup in Cuba, the Soviets would continue the buildup of strategic weapons in Cuba They would probably expect their missile forces in Cuba to make some contribution to their total strategic capability. Conversely, anti-Communists and those who relate their own interests to those of the US would be strongly discouraged. It seems clear that, especially over the long run, there would be a loss of confidence in US power and determination and a serious decline of US influence generally.

SOURCE E *Fidel Castro's commentaries on the missile crisis, taken from **Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse**, New York, 1993, edited by Blight, Allyn and Welch, three highly respected North American academics. Reproduced with the permission of the Avalon Project, Yale Law Library.*

Khrushchev continued to read (Kennedy's letter) and at a certain moment the message said "we have fulfilled our commitments". Listen to these words "we have withdrawn, or we are withdrawing, or we're going to withdraw the missiles from Turkey and Italy ...". When I (Castro) heard that, I imagine that Nikita (Khrushchev) realized that that was the last sentence I wanted to hear. He knew how I thought and how we were totally against being used as a bargaining chip. That ran counter to the theory that the missiles had been sent to defend Cuba. You do not defend Cuba by withdrawing missiles from Turkey... Defending Cuba would have been accomplished by insisting that the United States withdraw from its base at Guantánamo, stop the pirate attacks, and end the blockade (of Cuba). But withdrawing missiles from Turkey completely contradicted the theory that the main objective of the deployment had been defending Cuba.
