

**History route 2**  
**Higher level and standard level**  
**Paper 1 – the Arab–Israeli conflict 1945–1979**

Friday 13 November 2015 (morning)

1 hour

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**Instructions to candidates**

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.
- The maximum mark for this examination paper is **[25 marks]**.

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the October War of 1973: consequences (up to and including 1979).

**Source A** Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt, in a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly (9 November 1977).

When we go to Geneva, Israel cannot prevent me from claiming the territories occupied in 1967: [they are] Arab territories. Neither Israel nor any other power can prevent me from demanding the legitimate right of the Palestinians – the right to their own state. This is what Israel is trying to avoid, by raising unimportant issues, by adding a word or deleting another, releasing an announcement meant to provoke the Arab world and [meant to] shatter our nerves to the extent that we will announce our refusal to go to Geneva.

I am ready to go to Geneva – and I do not conceal this from you who are the representatives of the people and I say it in the hearing of our people and of the Arab nation. You heard me saying that I am prepared to go to the ends of this earth if my doing so will prevent any of my officers or men being killed or wounded ... Israel will be amazed to hear me say that we do not refuse – I am prepared to go to their very home, to the Knesset [Israeli Parliament] itself and discuss things with them.

**Source B** Colin Shindler, a professor of Israeli Studies, writing in the academic book *The Land Beyond Promise: Israel, Likud\* and the Zionist Dream* (1995).

Ariel Sharon viewed the occupation of the West Bank as a continuation of the settlement drive which had been a feature of Zionist activity before the State of Israel was established. Sharon regarded the River Jordan as Israel's eastern border, and as early as 1974 he stated that Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] were "an inseparable part of Israel and from the security point of view there is no chance of giving them up ... If we want a strong independent state we must give up settling just on the coastal strip, and move elsewhere. Otherwise Israel would consist of a mass of concrete from Ashkelon to Nehariya [towns on Israel's coast] – all within range of Arab guns."

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\* Likud: an Israeli political party that wanted to expand Israel's territory

**Source C**

Michael Cummings, a political cartoonist, depicts the outcome of President Carter's mediation between Egypt and Israel in the cartoon "Professor! My triumph's more amazing than your Relativity Theory – I'VE passed a camel through the eye of a needle!", from the British newspaper the *Daily Express* (1979).



[Source: Michael Cummings/Express Newspapers/N&S Syndication]

The figure holding the "camel's" rein is US President Carter, the "camel" is Egyptian President Sadat, and the "needle" is the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. The inscription on the pyramid is: "THE GREAT PYRAMID OF DOLLARS FOR SADAT & BEGIN: 10 MILES HIGH". **Note:** Einstein's Theory of Relativity is widely regarded as one of the great achievements of the 20th century.

**Source D**

Kirsten Schulze, a university lecturer in International History, writing in a book for students, *The Arab–Israeli Conflict* (1999).

Both Begin and Sadat had difficulties convincing the public that the concessions made were justified. Sadat had cut Egypt off from the rest of the Arab world, while Begin was faced with the emergence of a radical opposition ... that was determined to fight against Camp David. Despite these obstacles, Sadat and Begin were able to achieve legitimacy [validity] in the eyes of most Egyptians and most Israelis respectively.

On 26 March 1979 the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty was signed, Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in return for peace, full diplomatic relations, and shipping through the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba. In the months following the treaty, it became clear that Begin had no intention of giving up Israeli control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The continuation and indeed increase of Israeli settlement activity confirmed this. It is thus not surprising that the negotiations on the setting up of a Palestinian self-governing authority only continued for a short period and were suspended by the end of 1979. The Carter administration was unable to put pressure on Israel, because it became caught up in other international issues and upcoming presidential elections.

**Source E** Alan Dowty, a professor of Middle Eastern Studies, writing in an academic book, *Israel/Palestine* (2005).

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) radicals opposed the support for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza on the grounds that it would be regarded by the world as a permanent solution to the conflict, thus ending the Palestinian struggle for total liberation. PLO moderates, however, saw the idea as a way of getting the Israeli army out of the West Bank and Gaza – the major concern of residents in those areas – and establishing the principle of Palestinian self-determination, even in a small area.

In a compromise reached by the Palestine National Council in June 1974, the PLO reaffirmed ... its commitment to armed struggle, and its goal of liberating the whole of Palestine. But at the same time, “the PLO will consider any step toward liberation as the first stage in their aim to establish a Palestinian state”.

1. (a) What, according to Source B, was the attitude of Ariel Sharon towards Israel’s boundaries? [3]
- (b) What is the message conveyed by Source C? [2]
  
2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A and D about Arab–Israeli relations in the period after the end of the October War of 1973. [6]
  
3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source E for historians studying Arab–Israeli relations in the period 1973 to 1979. [6]
  
4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you think that there had been progress in resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict between 1973 and 1979? [8]