



# **Markscheme**

**May 2019**

**Global politics**

**Higher level and standard level**

**Paper 2**

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The paper is marked using the generic markbands on the following page, and the paper specific markscheme that follows. The markscheme for this paper is the same for HL and SL.

**Important points to note**

- The content listed in the markscheme indicates possible areas candidates might cover in their answers. Candidates may take a different approach, which if appropriate, should be rewarded. Examiners should not expect all of the information listed and should allow other valid points.
- Students are expected to draw on political concepts that are relevant to the arguments they put forward. These will usually be, but are not always, taken from the concepts listed in the global politics guide – if they are valid and relevant to the answer, they can be rewarded.
- The paper expects conceptual understanding but extensive knowledge of political theory is **not** required unless the question specifies it.
- Explicit stand-alone definitions are not required: understanding of terms may sometimes be conveyed as effectively through the way they are woven into the response.
- Please do keep in mind the IB command term associated with each question and recognize what candidates are required to do in response.
- The candidates are heavily time-constrained so numerous examples are not expected.

**Markbands for paper two**

Marks	Level descriptor
0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The work does not reach a standard described by the descriptors below.</li> </ul>
1–5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The response reveals limited understanding of the demands of the question.</li> <li>• The response is poorly structured, or where there is a recognizable essay structure there is minimal focus on the task.</li> <li>• There is little relevant knowledge, and examples are either lacking or not relevant.</li> <li>• The response is mostly descriptive.</li> </ul>
6–10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The response indicates some understanding of the demands of the question.</li> <li>• There is some evidence of an attempt to structure the response.</li> <li>• Some relevant knowledge is present, and some examples are mentioned but they are not developed or their relevance to arguments is not clear.</li> <li>• The response demonstrates limited understanding of the key concepts of the course.</li> <li>• There is limited justification of main points.</li> <li>• Counterclaims, or different views on the question are not considered.</li> </ul>
11–15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The demands of the question are understood and mostly addressed but the implications are not considered.</li> <li>• There is a clear attempt to structure the response.</li> <li>• The response is mostly based on relevant and accurate knowledge of global politics, and relevant examples are given and support arguments.</li> <li>• The response demonstrates some understanding of the key concepts of the course.</li> <li>• Many of the main points are justified and arguments are largely coherent.</li> <li>• Some counterclaims, or different views on the question are considered.</li> </ul>
16–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The demands of the questions are understood and addressed, and most implications are considered.</li> <li>• The response is well-structured.</li> <li>• The response demonstrates relevant and accurate knowledge and understanding of global politics, and relevant examples are used in a way that strengthens arguments.</li> <li>• The response demonstrates a good grasp of the key concepts of the course.</li> <li>• All or nearly all of the main points are justified and arguments are coherent.</li> <li>• Counterclaims, or different views on the question are explored.</li> </ul>
21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A very well structured and balanced response that addresses the demands and implications of the question.</li> <li>• Comprehensive knowledge and in-depth understanding of global politics is applied in the response consistently and effectively, with examples integrated.</li> <li>• The response demonstrates a very good grasp of the key concepts of the course.</li> <li>• All of the main points are justified. Arguments are clear, coherent and compelling.</li> <li>• Counterclaims, or different views on the question are explored and evaluated.</li> </ul>

## Power, sovereignty and international relations

### 1. Evaluate the claim that sovereign states become less powerful when they join intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).

Responses should include a conceptualization of state power, pooled sovereignty and interdependence. Power is defined as the ability to make an actor do something or face consequences, or to achieve a desired outcome using different means through use of both coercive and co-optive mechanisms. Responses are likely to include a definition of the concept of sovereignty (state or government has supreme, unqualified authority). Candidates who make the distinction between international sovereignty and power within the international arena versus domestic sovereignty and power over the territory and people that the state controls should be rewarded by examiners as should those candidates who engage with different conceptualisations of 'power' (eg relative vs. absolute or hard vs. soft). The same is true for candidates that recognise that different states join IGO's for different reasons. Candidates could then discuss the concept of pooled sovereignty through membership of intergovernmental organizations such as the UN. A range of intergovernmental organizations should be considered, and their different purposes could be indicated, but answers could show an understanding of the voluntary nature of joining an organization.

*Arguments supporting the claim that states become less powerful when they join IGOs may include:*

- IGOs are becoming more numerous and overlapping and states are subject to many complex demands made of membership. They might feel a negative impact on their power in the process of joining or maintaining memberships of intergovernmental organizations. IGOs such as WTO have rules and preconditions for membership
- IGOs can create laws and compel member states to comply (eg European Commission and EU law)
- states sacrifice their sovereignty by conceding national rights and accepting new, tougher obligations and scrutiny, or replacing control over a national currency with a common currency (eg universal human rights' challenge to sovereignty, EU's laws and rules) which limits their power to act unimpeded
- IGOs also tend to be dominated by the bigger and more powerful countries, so the weaker and smaller countries may find themselves weaker and with eroded sovereignty within these organizations (eg P5 in UN and veto power)
- there are chances of exploitation – of resources, cheap manpower *etc* of less powerful countries which may be pushed to be part of economic IGOs and become obliged to provide raw materials and cheap labour to the more economically powerful countries (eg structural adjustment programme of the IMF and World Bank).

*Arguments against the claim that states become less powerful when they join IGOs may include:*

- states are subject to many benefits that IGOs provide through pooling sovereignty. The ability to influence and opportunities to increase cooperation and agreement with other states becomes much more. This does not reduce their power, but enhances it – eg more military support in times of need/conflict or economic advantages which enhance economic power
- it is increasingly difficult for states to behave unilaterally in many areas of global politics such as global trade. States sacrifice their sovereignty and gain economic power in terms of regulation and stabilization (WTO) and greater trading power or the stability of a common currency (EU)
- transnational issues can be more easily met by collective action and the resources of IGOs. By collectively seeking to minimize threats eg environmental threats or the spread of diseases, all states may be retaining power and even the viability of states' sovereignty
- smaller or weaker states with less ability to coerce may be able to benefit from the status and diplomatic influence and power that being a member of an IGO can bring, especially within a region (AU).
- powerful states may choose not to fully cooperate with the demands of an IGO, which typically operate through consensus. Many IGOs have the right of veto which protects the national interests of such states so that membership may not represent a check on their power (eg Russia as a permanent UN member and its use of military power despite condemnation) – here they arguably wield more power as part of an IGO
- states themselves have the power to decide whether and which intergovernmental organization they wish to join and can choose to opt out or stay away if they wish to
- IGOs have weak enforcement mechanisms and some states at least can choose to ignore laws or mechanisms of an IGO.

Responses should contain references to specific examples. Candidates could cite cases of IGOs such as the UN, EU and WTO. *Eg*, if member states refuse to follow EU directives in the economic arena, infringement procedures could follow through the European Court of Justice. The UN veto system which gives even more power to powerful countries could be an example of the fact that membership of IGOs does not erode but arguably enhances the power of these sovereign countries. Candidates could then conclude by discussing to what extent they think sovereign states become less powerful by joining IGOs.

**2. Evaluate the effectiveness of collective security in responding to threats from state and non-state actors.**

Responses should demonstrate a clear understanding of the concept of collective security (bilateral or multilateral security arrangement in which war against one is considered war against all, commitment to threats and breaches of peace), use examples of collective security mechanisms (such as NATO, OAS and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and collective security initiatives by the UN. State and non-state actors need to be explained with examples which should be linked to specific threats or security issues where possible – eg terrorism, organized crime, military attack on another state or protestors who wish to destabilize a state. Candidates could then go on to discuss the effectiveness of collective security in responding to threats, while clearly mentioning the kind of threat and whether it emanates from a state or non-state actor.

*Arguments for the effectiveness of collective security in responding to threats may include:*

- many contemporary security threats are transnational in nature and would benefit from collective security mechanisms. Threats could be both from within a state (internal security issues) or from outside (global security issues). CS could be possibly used in all such situations
- threats from non-state actors such as terrorist groups (non-state actors) can affect large populations within states and across regions. Significant military resources may be needed, and collective security organizations can provide this. NATO invoked Article 5 (collective defence) for the first time in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the USA (NSAs).
- the collective security approach may be useful in promoting peaceful norms, cooperation and tackling complex challenges – eg ASEAN and disputed rights in the South China Sea
- for weaker states which might not have enough resources or power to handle a security threat, collective security through organizations such as the UN is an effective safeguard. The UN itself is based on the organizing principle of collective security
- collective security mechanisms also take care of threats from states eg NATO entered Kosovo (state actor) to end widespread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence (2008), NATO helped to create a Kosovo Security Force
- collective security has been used to manage threats from state actors such as in Syria (after chemical attacks by the Assad regime) and Libya where bombings were carried out, eg NATO took over control of all military operations for Libya in March 2011. The UN mandate was carried out successfully and the operation was terminated in 2011 after having fulfilled its objectives
- collective security has helped secure waters from threat of non-state actors – piracy – eg in the Mediterranean Sea NATO launched the maritime surveillance Operation Active Endeavour, focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean while Combined Task Force 151 sanctioned anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden
- collective security groupings like OAS now expanding concept of security to include new threats such as illegal arms trafficking, drug trafficking and mine clearing – making them more effective and relevant to tackle security threats.

*Arguments against the effectiveness of collective security in responding to threats may include:*

- many non-state actors pose threats to states as part of a broader violent struggle about a political cause or issue of injustice. Successfully combatting the threat may involve state led actions such as negotiations and engagements with underlying societal issues
- collective security organizations may not be effective in responding to many small and spontaneous challenges presented by some non-state actors
- conflicting state goals and interests (realist outlook) may hamper the functioning and effectiveness of collective security in the future
- at times, collective security is not effective due to interference from powerful actors, eg in the Kosovo crisis of 1999, there was no action against Serbia in the UN as two P-5 states – Russia and China – opposed the action
- states may choose not to join a collective security organization and lose their unilateral diplomatic and military leverage.

Responses should contain references to specific examples. Candidates could cite cases of successes of collective security through the UN, NATO and OAS in managing threats from both state and non-state actors. Candidates could then conclude by discussing whether or to what extent they think collective security helps to tackle threats from state and non-state actors.



## Human rights

### 3. Discuss whether the politicization of human rights has hindered their universal application.

Human rights organizations often set priorities and allocate resources based on specific criteria, and political considerations and preferences often influence those decisions. Countries' human rights records can be used by other countries as a means to rationalize policy decisions (eg, trade preferences), to seek or justify punitive measures (eg, sanctions), or, conversely, to reward (eg, aid packages). Other actors including NGOs and activists can politicize human rights, inserting political biases into the human rights dialogue (eg, pro-Western bias).

Responses should demonstrate a clear understanding of human rights and that human rights can be used as a political tool by states and non-state actors. This should be tied then to the effect of politicization on the universal application of human rights (eg, a country reacting negatively to the use of their human rights record in this way by distancing themselves from the international human rights regime; the credibility gap created by the manipulation of human rights for political goals).

*Arguments that the use of human rights as a political tool has hindered their universal application may include:*

- politicization leads to multiple political actors with varied motivations targeting different countries, affecting states' motivations for implementing and enforcing human rights (eg, the use of human rights violations seen as an excuse for US support of the 2002 coup attempt in Venezuela, providing the regime with a scapegoat in the human rights dialogue)
- many countries see the existing human rights regime as a Western construct and a tool for continued Western domination; therefore, cultural differences are used as a weapon (eg, opposition to the ICC within the African Union given the perception of neocolonialism)
- political bias influences access to support and resources that would help aid the universal application of human rights (eg, the use of sanctions by the EU against Zimbabwe under Mugabe for human rights abuses seen by many as heightening the economic crisis and increasing human rights issues)
- politicization can promote the withdrawal of states that feel unduly persecuted or singled out from human rights treaties and covenants (eg, the threat of withdrawal from the ICC by South Africa and Burundi)
- the overt use of human rights as an argument to achieve political goals undermines the credibility of the universality of human rights and the human rights organizations themselves, thereby hindering the universal application of human rights (eg, Rwandan criticism of Human Rights Watch as being inherently anti-RPF and attempting to influence internal politics).

*Arguments that the use of human rights as a political tool has **not** hindered their universal application may include:*

- human rights are understood as being universal and, therefore, they cannot be used as a political tool because they are not inherently biased (*ie*, logically, universality excludes manipulation based on sub-groups)
- human rights are by their nature political, and therefore, politicization is integral to their understanding, monitoring, and enforcement (eg, the extension of the right of women to drive in Saudi Arabia influenced by domestic and international pressure by women's advocates)
- politicization permits the inclusion of multiple voices/pluralism in defining human rights, thereby supporting rather than hindering their universal application (eg, pluralism and activism resulting in expanding the right to the institution of marriage in Australia through the Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious Freedoms) Act 2017).

Responses should make some reference to specific examples of politicization of human rights and its effects, such as: NGO criticism of the human rights records of states such as Amnesty International's criticism of states including China, USA, and Russia; states' retaliation for criticism or pressure such as Israel's expulsion of the Human Rights Watch (HRW) director after criticism of Israel for breaches of human rights violations or Nicaragua's expulsion of the UN human rights team after criticism; states' threat of/or withdrawal from existing treaties and institutions such as the withdrawal of the USA from the UN Human Rights Council given UN criticism of US border policy or threats by individual states including South Africa to withdraw from the ICC or of collective withdrawal by the African Union given perceptions of being disproportionately targeted for criticism or sanction.

Responses should include a clear assessment of whether the use of human rights as a political tool poses a problem for the universal application of human rights.

4. “For human rights laws and treaties to be effective, states must give up some sovereignty”. Evaluate this statement.

Responses should demonstrate an understanding that sovereignty characterizes a state’s independence, control over its territory, and international recognition, while human rights laws and treaties are created through the cooperation of sovereign states. Given this cooperation, states are agreeing to abide by the collective agreement that many see as a sacrifice of sovereign decision-making. The **effectiveness** of human rights laws and treaties should be discussed with an emphasis on whether and/or how much state sovereignty must be relinquished to make such laws effective.

*Arguments that states must give up some sovereignty for human rights laws and treaties to be effective may include:*

- a willingness on the part of states to abide by the laws and treaties to which they agree regardless of the states’ self-interest in order for them to be effective demonstrates a loss of some degree of sovereignty
- the responsibility of states to enforce these laws and treaties regardless of cost, domestic priorities, or other impediments if they are to be effective demonstrates a loss of some degree of sovereignty
- the fact that human rights are a transnational issue and require a transnational approach to their creation, monitoring, and enforcement, implicitly challenges the role of the state
- the creation of international institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council is necessary for human rights laws and treaties to be effective, and such international institutions usurp power from the state.

*Arguments that states need not give up some sovereignty for human rights laws and treaties to be effective may include:*

- human rights are universal and inalienable and apply to the individual, and therefore, individuals have recourse regardless of states and state sovereignty (eg, the ability of individuals to take cases to international venues, such as the US’s Torture Victim Suppression Act)
- human rights are embedded often into national constitutions and/or bills of rights, and therefore states need not give up sovereignty for human rights law to be effective (eg, the preamble of the French Constitution; the 14th Amendment of the US)
- states themselves are the signatories to human rights laws and covenants and demonstrate their sovereignty by making the decision to participate (eg, South Africa’s threat, and then reversal, on withdrawing from the ICC demonstrate its sovereignty)
- human rights laws and treaties are well-entrenched and do not rely on individual state membership; if individual states withdraw from human rights laws and it is not an impediment to realizing effective human rights laws and treaties internationally (eg, US withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council does not result in an end to its work or effective human rights).

Responses should make some reference to specific examples of human rights laws and treaties in discussing their efficacy and interaction with state sovereignty, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Rome Statute. Students may reference the joining and withdrawal of individual states from agreements in discussing the need for states to relinquish state sovereignty for human rights laws and treaties to be effective.

Responses should include a clear assessment of whether states must give up some sovereignty for human rights laws and treaties to be effective.

## Development

### 5. Discuss the view that development damages well-being.

Responses should demonstrate a clear understanding of both the concepts of well-being and development. Well-being combines objective assessments of people's lives with their subjective accounts. Although sustainable development is not mentioned in the question it is reasonable to expect that responses will focus on it, arguing the counterclaim that development without damage to well-being is possible if development is sustainable. However, well-being also has economic, social and political dimensions which may be disrupted by development.

*Arguments in favour of the claim that development damages well-being may include:*

- because the definition of well-being involves both objective and subjective measures, development may be perceived as damaging even if material welfare improves, for example, there is a general perception that development damages the environment more quickly than it can recover
- because development is rarely sustainable it damages the physical environment and this harms the well-being of future generations. Lifestyles that fully respect the ecological constraints of the environment may not be possible
- development necessarily involves the repurposing of land and labour, which may cause environmental harm and the disruption of social and cultural norms eg traditions, languages, family and kinship, beliefs. For example, illegal logging threatens the survival of Amazonian rainforest tribes
- improvements in personal material well-being resulting from development may not be distributed equitably, giving rise to feelings of damage to economic and social wellbeing (which may impact negatively on political well-being for some and create resentment. For example, rising inequality in the Americas has been linked to polarization in politics and growing "plutocratic populism".

*Arguments against the claim that development damages well-being may include:*

- sustainable development can at least preserve the physical environment for future generations. For example, electric cars powered by hydro-electricity have drastically reduced emissions in Norwegian cities
- development can lead to objectively measurable improvements in well-being in personal and material terms through poverty reduction, for example China's economic development has led to a huge fall in the poverty rate from 88 % in 1981 to 6.5 % in 2012
- if sustainable, development can lead to improvements in key elements. These include environment, governance (well-functioning institutions), civil society (political and social freedoms) and income equality; if improved, these elements are most likely to lead to greater well-being
- development promotes participation in the global economy, reducing the likelihood of extreme shocks such as local famines and epidemics and thus enhancing well-being. For example, the growth of trade blocs such as the European Union has made countries more economically and politically interdependent.

Responses should contain references to specific examples. Examples of countries with the highest rates of converting economic growth into well-being are Norway, The Netherlands, Finland and Germany. Among the lowest are Greece and the Central African Republic (OECD Better Life Index).

Responses should include the candidate's discussion of the likelihood of damage to well-being in development. It might be argued that if development is sustainable then well-being is enhanced.

**6. Evaluate the claim that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a limited effect on development.**

Responses should demonstrate a clear understanding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and development. Responses might argue that NGOs operate mainly in the third sector and that therefore their efforts are small relative to those of big corporations and governments, and that they are more focused on addressing tragic and disastrous outcomes than promoting future developments. On the other hand, microfinance NGOs are specifically focused on development and may have considerable effects on development where well developed, as in Bangladesh.

*Arguments in favour of the claim that NGOs have a limited effect on development may include:*

- NGOs tend to focus on particular, more narrow aspects of development eg Red Cross (humanitarian), WWF and Greenpeace (environment), MSF (health) rather than a whole-country view of development
- development depends on so many factors (institutional, social, political, environmental) that NGOs are unable to stimulate development alone
- governments of LEDCs may be propped up or become dependent on assistance from NGOs (eg South Sudan, Timor Leste)
- aid offered by NGOs may be inefficient, inappropriate or ineffective
- the activities of NGOs in development are small relative to those of big companies' foreign direct investment and governments' official development assistance
- NGOs lack the funding that state or intergovernmental organizations might have, so some of their energies are consumed by maintaining financial sustainability
- NGOs can be manipulated by state governments. NGOs operate only with permission of governments, which can revoke access if they do not like the actions of the NGOs. For example, recently, the governments of India, Pakistan and Turkey have limited foreign NGO activities.

*Arguments against the claim that NGOs have a limited effect on development may include:*

- NGOs are effective at mobilizing awareness of factors which inhibit development in LEDCs, eg Oxfam's work in poverty relief, Make Poverty History etc
- NGOs are good at raising much-needed funds in developed countries to assist development through aid in LEDCs. A small donation from people/organisations in a MEDC can have a large effect in a LEDC
- NGOs may target expertise at the most vital pre-requisites for development, eg education of girls (Mary's Meals), microfinance (KIVA, Lend With Care)
- private philanthropy finds expression through NGOs on a large scale eg Gates Foundation (improving education, health, reducing poverty)
- private development aid from the USA exceeded its Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2013 and over half came from NGOs
- NGOs may be considered to lack bias because they are not directly related to state activities, which might make them more effective.

Responses should contain references to specific examples. For example, Oxfam and The Global Fund have played a considerable part in turning around the AIDS, TB, polio and malaria epidemics throughout the world. Also, maternal and infant deaths have halved and millions more children attend school. Responses may include local examples of the work of small scale NGOs. It may be argued that it is hard to find examples of whole-country development that can be attributed to NGOs.

Responses should include the candidate's discussion of whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a limited effect on development.

## Peace and conflict

### 7. To what extent do you agree with the claim that addressing structural violence is increasingly important to achieving lasting peace?

Responses should demonstrate a clear understanding of the concepts of structural violence and peace. Structural violence could be defined as a form of violence not caused by an identifiable actor, but one in which some social structure, system or institution harms people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs. This would encompass the notion of positive peace (absence of structural violence) – “attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies”, elimination of exploitation and presence of a just and equitable social order. Candidates might also bring in differences between negative and positive peace and instances of what structural violence includes (such as gender-based violence, health issues such as malnutrition amongst children). They could then go on to discuss how addressing structural violence is increasingly important to achieving lasting peace.

*Arguments supporting the claim that addressing structural violence is increasingly important to achieving lasting peace may include:*

- the term peace itself has much wider connotations beyond mere absence of violence today. Positive peace is what most countries aim for since it provides the optimum environment for humans to flourish. It is simply the absence of structural violence
- people are still not necessarily at peace if structural violence of any kind is present. This also impacts development (especially human development) which also has broader connotations than simply economic development or eradication of poverty. *Eg* if gender discrimination is practised in jobs, human development can never progress positively
- until structural violence issues are sorted, there is often potential for outbreak of discontent violence which will again. There is thus a need to understand and end conditions which could trigger violence again and potentially lead to further repression of the disadvantaged. Structural violence is often an underlying cause of direct violence
- negative peace or the mere end to violence is not enough to bring about an end to underlying problems which need to be identified and solved. Besides the welfare of people across the state, provision of health facilities and eradication of poverty are all related to basic human rights and are therefore critical
- positive peace (end of structural violence) indicators such as good government, equitable distribution of resources and low corruption can help a country’s ability to recover from shocks. Such countries show higher GDP growth, better ecological performance, are more inclusive (gender) *etc*. It can also be used to measure fragility and to help predict the likelihood of conflict, violence, and instability
- cultural violence or an aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form is symbolic violence built into a culture. Although it does not kill like direct violence, it is used to legitimize either or both. Examples of cultural violence include the division of culture into religion and ideology, art and language, and empirical and formal science (logic or mathematics). *Eg* racial discrimination which leads to other problems.

*Arguments against the claim that addressing structural violence is increasingly important to achieving lasting peace may include:*

- recognizing and addressing structural violence is very difficult to achieve. It is normative and may take a long time to end given the required structural changes in a society. In other words, it is difficult to end structural violence, as this might be an utopian ideal. Structural violence exists even in otherwise “peaceful” countries
- unlike direct violence which is easy to recognize, and garners attention from both governments, non-governmental organizations and media, structural violence is challenging to respond to
- in cases where direct violence is extreme or high involving loss of life and property, addressing structural violence is not as critical as bringing in negative peace or an end to violence. *Eg* situation of extreme violence in Syria needs to be addressed first before addressing structural violence there
- until structural violence issues are sorted, there is potential for outbreak of violence to erupt again because underlying discontent and issues might not have been solved. Therefore negative peace does not necessarily ensure long lasting peace.

Responses should contain references to specific examples. Candidates could cite cases of countries ranked high on positive peace and therefore less structural violence such as Iceland, New Zealand, Denmark, while also discussing situations which may or may not have witnessed negative peace but have continued to have lack of positive peace or unrest such as Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. They can then go on to argue to what extent addressing structural violence is a key to lasting peace today.

**8. Evaluate the claim that conflict resolution is not always possible through negotiations and treaties.**

Responses should demonstrate a clear understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. Conflict can be defined as opposition of needs, values and interests, and can be violent or non-violent. Conflict management and resolution includes efforts to remove and/or settle the contentious issues under dispute between parties. Possible methods of conflict resolution in inter-state or intra-state conflicts may be discussed. These include coercive peacemaking through military options, imposed settlements, ceasefires, arbitration, economic sanctions, embargoes, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Responses should pay particular attention to the key concepts of negotiations and treaties as per the question

Negotiations between disputing parties can help them find areas of common interest where compromise can be reached, establishing the basis for a long-lasting settlement that prevents the need for violence. Even if no compromise agreement is possible, a commitment to avoiding conflict among two sides can encourage disputants to avoid war and use political approaches to achieve their goals. A lack of readiness or commitment to negotiated settlement, however, can result from a range of issues including lack of third party involvement or commitment, a lack of cohesion within the parties involved, and the actions of rogue actors.

*Arguments why conflict resolution is not always possible through negotiations and treaties may include:*

- The escalation and continuation of violence without negotiation may require coercive measures to end the violence
- Different rates at which conflicting parties reach “war weariness” can impede the potential of negotiation (eg FARC and the Colombian government)
- a lack of political will by third parties to engage in and mediate conflict, particularly where the process is intermittent and lacks political salience
- negotiations may become deadlocked or even fail to get under way if the level of hostility between the conflicting parties is too high, if there is a serious power imbalance between them, if one side fails to recognize the legitimacy of the other, or if the negotiation process is tainted by misperception or miscommunication
- Negotiation can be hampered by relationship blockages, such as ongoing rivalries, historical enmity or the lack of effective communication channels (eg India and Pakistan)

*Arguments why conflict resolution may be possible through negotiations and treaties may include:*

- the ability of third parties to broker ceasefires and serve as guarantors
- its flexibility in form, ranging from joint, voluntary, non-binding agreements to negotiated settlements that entail power-sharing or other concessions
- negotiations can institutionalize bilateral conflict management norms through building up habits of communication and political cooperation
- some forms of conflict (eg, environmental matters or cyber warfare or other non-violent conflicts) do not necessarily lend themselves to solutions through the use of hard power. These might need use of more soft power approaches for effective resolution such as negotiation
- long term conflict resolution requires peacebuilding with cooperation and buy-in of the parties involved, and long-term peace relies on dialogue and negotiation
- there has been a proliferation of platforms or organizations to help conflicting parties reach a resolution (UN, ASEAN, OSCE and other intergovernmental and international organizations)

Candidates should include examples of conflict resolution in problems between or within states where reliance on negotiations was both important and effective. They should provide examples of conflict resolution as a consequence of negotiations/treaties such as: the end of the siege of Sarajevo in 1995; Sudan’s decision to split the country in two in 2011; the Good Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement) in Northern Ireland in 1998; Kenya in 2008; Colombia in 2016.